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Abstract
Cultural change is an inevitable aspect of life; however, how people react to cultural
change can dramatically vary. Of particular interest to this analysis is how White
Americans react to cultural changes occurring in the nation. Across three studies, I
examined how White Americans may see cultural change, in the form of demographic
change, as threatening and how these threat perceptions may influence their endorsement
of White nationalism beliefs and support for outgroup restricting policies. This
investigation found that White participants who read about real demographic changes
occurring in the nation endorsed more threat perceptions (Study 1). Furthermore, there
was tentative evidence that certain threat perceptions were positively related to
endorsement of White nationalism beliefs and support for outgroup restricting policies.
Although attempts to manipulate specific threat perceptions within the cultural change
paradigm was relatively successful (Study 2a), none of these threat manipulations
predicted endorsement of White nationalism beliefs nor support for outgroup restricting
policies (Study 2b). Theoretical implications and avenues for future research are
discussed.
Keywords: cultural inertia, threat perception, demographic change, intergroup
relations, White nationalism, policy support

2
Cultural Change and Threat Perception: Causal Implications on White Nationalism
Beliefs and Outgroup Restricting Policies
Thanks to mass immigration, America has experienced greater demographic
change in the last few decades than any other country in history has undergone
during peacetime… Again and again, we are told these changes are entirely
good… We must celebrate the fact that a nation that was overwhelmingly
European, Christian, and English-speaking fifty years ago has become a place
with no ethnic majority, immense religious pluralism, and no universally shared
culture or language. (Carlson, 2018, p. 10)
Cultural change1 is an inevitable aspect of life—social realities shift and with it
personal, community, national, and global culture changes (Haferkamp, & Smelser,
1992). To some, these cultural changes indicate hope and progress; to others, like Tucker
Carlson in the above quote, these cultural changes are an indication of a degrading
society. Although the majority (60%) of Americans feel that changes in traditional ways
of life will make the country’s future better (Silver et al., 2021), it is clear that not all
Americans feel this way. Whereas 29 – 33% of Black and Hispanic Americans are
pessimistic about the future, 49% of White Americans are pessimistic about what the
future may hold for the country (Parker et al., 2019). A PRRI and The Atlantic research
report found that 68% of White working-class Americans felt that the United States was
in danger of losing its culture and identity, with 48% of sampled working-class Whites

This paper will utilize Varnum & Grossmann’s definition of cultural change: “changes
in ideas, norms, and behaviors of a group of people (or changes in the contents or themes
of their products reflecting such changes), over time, typically on the scale of decades or
centuries” (pp. 957, 2017).
1
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saying that recent cultural changes make them feel like a stranger in the United States
(Cox et al., 2017). Altogether, this suggests that a plurality of White Americans is fearful
of what the future may hold for them as culture in the United States continues to change.
Although the United States was ostensibly founded as a nation of immigrants
seeking freedom and tolerance; in reality, the United States has almost exclusively
functioned as a White cultural hegemony. Within this White cultural hegemony, White
folks’ power and influence have been at the heart of directing the nations’ laws since its
very inception (e.g., who could vote or own property) as well as directing the cultural
values of the nation (e.g., the Protestant work ethic). Consequently, cultural shifts away
from this White hegemony can be met with staunch resistance by the White majority as
they may feel like cultural change is in direct opposition to the very essence of their
version of American cultural identity. Therefore, some Whites’ fear of cultural change in
the United States can lead to adverse outcomes and may explain why the nation has
experienced a nearly 30% increase in White-committed hate crimes within the last 5
years (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2019; U.S. Department of Justice, 2020).
This proposal seeks to understand how White Americans perceive cultural change
in the nation and how they react to these perceived changes. Specifically, this proposal
will investigate reactions to cultural change through the presentation of real demographic
changes occurring in the nation. This proposal will utilize cultural inertia theory as a
framework by which to understand how cultural change may uniquely affect White threat
perception. Furthermore, this proposal will utilize intergroup threat theory as a guide in
understanding the theoretical underpinnings of threat and the operationalization of the
construct. Although previous research has found overall support for the idea that White
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Americans find demographic changes threatening, this proposal will extend prior
research by measuring the perception of a wider variety of threats within a single study.
Furthermore, this proposal will be one of the first to manipulate the presentation of threat
information in conjunction to demographic changes to determine whether different threat
perceptions have a causal influence on White participants’ reaction to these cultural
threats.
Cultural Change and Cultural Inertia Theory
Cultural change can be understood through an ecological approach grounded in
ideas of behavioral ecology (Davies et al., 2012). This ecological view proposes that
people acquire elements of culture that will increase their fitness (or likelihood to pass on
genes, directly or indirectly) within their particular set of ecological conditions
(Gangestad et al., 2006; Schaller & Murray, 2011; Thornhill & Fincher, 2014).
Consequently, ecological dimensions such as resource scarcity and population density
will influence cultural changes within a society (Grossmann & Varnum, 2015). This
ecological approach is largely used to understand cultural changes at a societal level (e.g.,
understanding how national culture changes over decades of time; Grossmann &Varnum,
2015); however, it may also help to explain why cultural changes may not be experienced
the same by subgroups of people within a society. For instance, people within a society
will experience resource scarcity differently depending on their socioeconomic status;
therefore, these people may react differently to cultural changes brought forth from this
general scarcity of resources.
Cultural inertia theory (CIT) provides a detailed explanation for the different
ways people can react to changes in social and cultural norms. Cultural inertia theory
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posits that, similar to Sir Isaac Newton’s first law of motion, a culture at rest will stay at
rest, resisting change, and a culture in motion will continue in motion unless acted upon
by an outside force (Zárate et al., 2009, 2012). Furthermore, as in the third law of motion,
cultural inertia theory suggests that a culture met with unwanted change (either to
promote movement or curtail it) will resist the unwanted change in an “equal and
opposite” way (Zárate et al., 2019). In other words, cultural inertia theory describes the
differential preference for cultural change as a function of a person’s identification with
the current cultural environment, the perception that they will need to change to
accommodate another culture, and whether they believe the culture is already in motion
(Zárate et al., 2012). Therefore, to the extent that a one aligns themself with the
mainstream, dominant, culture they will resist changes to that culture. This is supported
by the ecological view of cultural change which suggests that trajectories of cultural
change are partially determined by the homogeneity of a society and the tolerance for
deviations from accepted cultural norms (Gelfand et al., 2011; Uz, 2015; Varnum &
Grossmann, 2017).
A Culture at Rest
A prime illustration of cultural inertia theory is the United States leading up to
and during the Civil Rights Movement. The United States in the 1950s was defined by
relative cultural stability and conformity (Dworkin, 2018; Riesman et al., 2001). More
specifically, 1950s American culture was defined and governed by White American
culture. To this very day, the American identity is often confounded with a White
American identity (Devos, 2006; Devos & Banaji, 2005; Dovidio, 2010). Therefore, a
White American identity is often perceived as a normative identity, especially for Whites
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in the 1950s. Thus, Whites connected to the White American culture were generally
invested in maintaining their majority culture; this is because highly identified group
members are more devoted to maintaining the integrity of their group identity (Jetten et
al., 2004; Lalonde, 2010).
Majority groups resist cultural inertia because minority group progress is often
perceived as necessitating their ingroup’s losses (i.e., zero-sum thinking; Bazerman et al.,
2001; Eibach & Keegan, 2006; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Thompson 1995). Therefore,
cultural concessions to Black Americans in the 1950s would have been perceived by
White Americans as a loss of ingroup status and power. In fact, researchers of the era
argued that resistance to integration efforts was predicated on White’s perception that
Black Americans were threatening their advantaged position in society (Blalock, 1967;
Blumer, 1958). In this view, allowing Black Americans access to the same resources and
spaces as White Americans would threaten White’s place in the United States because
White Americans would be forced to relinquish their exclusive resources and power; in
essence, White cultural stability would be forfeited to an unknown cultural variant.
Eibach and Keegan (2006) explored White’s perceptions of racial progress in
American society in a series of experiments. One experiment assigned participants to one
of three conditions: the minority gain condition asked students to draw graphs depicting
the percentage of non-White students admitted to universities in 1960 and the percentage
of non-White students admitted today; the White loss condition asked participants to
draw graphs showing the percentage of White students in 1960 and today; and the
minority gain/White loss condition asked participants to draw graphs showing the
percentage of White students and non-White students admitted to universities in 1960 and
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today. Results demonstrated that when primed to think about minority gains and White
losses, White participants exhibited more zero-sum thinking than when primed to think
only about minority gains (Eibach & Keegan, 2006). In fact, mean levels of zero-sum
thinking suggested that those in the minority gains condition did not endorse zero-sum
thinking, while those in the minority gains/White losses conditions did endorse zero-sum
thinking (Eibach & Keegan, 2006). Providing a potential explanation for these zero-sum
results, Plaut and colleagues found that White participants were faster at matching
multiculturism words with “exclusion” (vs. “inclusion”) than were minority participants
in an IAT task (2011), suggesting that White Americans do not perceive traditionally
inclusive ideologies as being inclusive to them. Therefore, changes in cultural norms
away from a traditional White hegemony would be perceived as changes that exclude
White folks, causing resistance to this potential cultural change.
A Culture in Motion
Conversely, Black Americans of the 50s and 60s did not experience White
cultural stability in the same way as White folk. The Civil Rights Movement was born
from the fundamental need and struggle for equal rights within the United States (Carson,
2020). This struggle necessitated a cultural shift in the United States away from a stable,
White cultural hegemony, towards a more inclusive culture. Black Americans tended to
view this need for cultural change in fundamentally different ways than White Americans
of the era. Whereas White Americans tend to see moves towards racial equality in terms
of losses, unsurprisingly, Black Americans tend to view these moves as gains (Eibach &
Keegan, 2006). In their aforementioned study, Eibach and Keegan (2006) found that nonWhite participants experienced no differences in their zero-sum thinking across
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educational equity conditions (minority gains, White losses, or minority gains/White
losses). In fact, mean levels of zero-sum thinking never passed the midpoint of the scale,
suggesting that the minority participants never endorsed zero-sum thinking (Eibach &
Keegan, 2006). Therefore, Black Americans in the 1950s did not perceive the cultural
motion as necessitating White loss; rather, this cultural inertia was desirable as it was a
way of bringing about parity for all U.S. citizens.
A Culture in Conflict
These starkly different perspectives on cultural change meant that White cultural
stability came into direct conflict with the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement. Those in
the White majority who enjoyed the cultural stability of the 1950s, actively resisted the
civil rights movement (Carson, 2020; Library of Congress, n.d.), as the Civil Rights
Movement was an unwanted change propelling their White American culture into
motion. Cultural inertia theory suggests that a highly identified majority group member
resists unwanted cultural changes because these cultural changes may require them to
change their identity to meet the cultural momentum (Eibach & Keegan, 2006; Voci,
2006; Zárate & Shaw, 2010; Zárate et al., 2012). Zárate and colleagues (2012) tested this
idea and found that when local Mexican American undergraduates (within a majority
Mexican-American cultural context) were led to believe that their majority ingroup
would need to change to accommodate an incoming population of military personnel to
the area, these undergraduates felt more symbolic threat (i.e., the outgroup would
undermine their local culture) and expressed more outgroup prejudice (i.e., hostilities
towards and disapproval of the outgroup) compared to conditions where they were led to
believe the military personnel would adopt the local culture (Zárate et al., 2012).
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Herein lies an important distinction, cultural inertia theory predicts that cultural
changes are only problematic to the majority group when there is the perceived pressure
for the dominant group to conform to the cultural changes (Zárate et al., 2012).
Consequently, Whites who live in diverse environments may not feel particularly
threatened by the potential for new cultural changes as they have likely experienced
cultural change already without adverse effects (Lee & Bean, 2010; Zárate & Shaw,
2010). This distinction is clearly demonstrated by the fact that not all White Americans in
the 50s and 60s resisted the Civil Rights Movement. cultural inertia theory would predict
that these White folk were either not highly identified with the majority White culture or
believed there was space for new cultural perspectives alongside the dominant White
culture. Therefore, White activists who supported the Civil Rights Movement likely did
not perceive cultural changes away from the White majority to be threatening and thus
they did not resist these changes.
Intergroup Threat Theory
As cultural changes can be threatening, it is important to understand what threat is
and how it is provoked. Intergroup threat theory (ITT), the revised version of integrated
threat theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), describes the causes,
types, and consequences of perceived threats. The theory states that a group threat is
experienced when a group member perceives that another group can cause their group
harm (Stephan et al., 2015). Because human beings are social creatures who form close
social connections within groups for survival (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Brewer, 1997;
Coon, 1946), they will act in the best interests of their ingroup’s survival (Branscombe et
al., 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) explain, group
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members are attuned to potential threats to their group because their group’s protection
confers their own personal protection and wellbeing. Therefore, group members are
motivated to minimize any potential harms levied at the ingroup to maximize their
chances to survive and thrive in society. Within this perspective, threats can be perceived
from any situation which puts group resources, security, or integrity at risk (Alexander,
1974; Branscombe et al., 1999; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Dunbar, 1988; Stephan et al.,
2015). Therefore, threat perception stems from a potential unwanted change to the
ingroup’s status quo; desirable or neutral changes to the ingroup’s status quo would not
be perceived as threatening because it would not put the ingroup at risk.
Within intergroup threat theory, there are two general categories of group threat:
realistic and symbolic threat. Realistic threats traditionally refer to tangible threats to
ingroup welfare (Stephan et al., 2002, 2015). Threats to ingroup welfare can come in
many different forms. For instance, realistic threats can refer to threats to ingroup power
or ability to influence others and effectively wield resources, most often of which is
through political power (Renfro et al., 2006; Stephan & Stephan, 2000) or economic
power (Stephan et al., 1999). Realistic threats may also refer to threats to one’s ability to
provide for themselves financially through jobs or social services, especially during times
of economic recession or high unemployment (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Esses et al.,
2016; Landmann et al., 2019; Renfro et al., 2006; Stupi et al., 2014). Realistic threats
may also refer to threats to physical safety through criminal behaviors or violence
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Cohrs et al., 2005; Hellmann et al., 2021; Landmann et al.,
2019). Realistic threats to individual and group health can come in the form of disease—
most notably through recent outbreaks of Ebola and Covid-19—which can adversely
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impact the group’s overall health or survival (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Kachanoff et al.,
2021; O’Leary et al., 2018; Pew Research Center, 2020). Finally, realistic threats may
also refer to threats to relative societal status2, or the relative amount of influence one
group has over another (Stephan et al., 2000; Bai & Simon, 2020).
Symbolic threats generally refer to threats to the ingroup’s sociocultural identity
or worldview (Kachanoff et al., 2019; Stephan et al., 2002, 2015). Symbolic threats can
refer to threats to the ingroups’ moral beliefs through the belief that the outgroup has a
different moral code or that the outgroup is altogether amoral (Brambilla & Butz, 2012;
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Stephan et al., 2002). Threats to ingroup values also may
constitute a symbolic threat (i.e., Protestant work ethic, traditional familial structures;
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Esses et al., 1993; Renfro et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 1999).
Symbolic threats may also involve threats to culture or traditions and ways of daily life
(Landmann et al., 2019; Makashvili et al., 2017; Renfro et al., 2006; Spencer-Rodgers &
McGovern, 2002). Finally, symbolic threats may include threats to prototypicality of the
ingroup, or how much the ingroup represents the larger societal norm (Meeussen et al.,
2013). Importantly, neither realistic nor symbolic threats need to be real; the simple
perception of one of these threats is sufficient for reaction to the threat.
Different researchers have taken different tactics when categorizing and
measuring these various realistic and symbolic threats. Traditional intergroup threat
theory research tends to measure realistic and symbolic threat using two separate,

2

Although status threat involves aspects of both realistic (e.g., threats to tangible
resources; Jetten, et al., 2002) and symbolic (e.g., group esteem; Branscombe et al., 2002;
Cameron et al., 2005) threats, typically the literature has classified status threats as
realistic threats (for an example see Rios et al., 2018). Therefore, for the purpose of this
dissertation, I will also classify status threat as a type of realistic threat.
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overarching realistic and symbolic threat scales (e.g., Stephan et al., 2000; Stephan et al.,
2002; Renfro et al., 2006). Realistic threats in these traditional scales are usually between
7 and 13 items and include items which tap into threats to political and economic power
(e.g., Aberson et al., 2020; Guillermo et al., 2021; Stephan et al., 2000; Stephan et al.,
2002; Renfro et al., 2006), and occasionally physical threats (e.g., Stephan et al., 2000;
Renfro et al., 2006) and education threats (e.g., Aberson et al., 2020). Traditional
symbolic threat measures vary from 7 to 13 items which usually measure threats to values
and norms (e.g., Aberson et al., 2020; Guillermo et al., 2021; Renfro et al., 2006; Stephan
et al., 2000; Stephan et al., 2002) and occasionally measure threats to culture (e.g.,
Guillermo et al., 2021; Renfro et al., 2006) and morality (e.g., Aberson et al., 2020;
Renfro et al., 2006). Other researchers have adapted these traditional realistic and
symbolic threat scales into more condensed 2 to 6 item measures tapping into specific
realistic and/or symbolic threats believed to be pertinent to their research questions (e.g.,
Demirkol & Nalla, 2021; Velasco et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2009). For instance, Velasco
and colleagues (2008) measured Dutch citizens’ threat perceptions of the Muslim
minority group in the country. These researchers measured symbolic threat perception
using an averaged three-item scale which assessed culture and value differences between
the Dutch and Muslim groups; these researchers measured realistic threat perception
using an averaged three-item scale focusing exclusively on the potential economic threats
Muslim minorities can contribute to, specifically, making it difficult for the Dutch
population to secure a job and housing (Velasco et al., 2008).
Potential Issues with Intergroup Threat Theory Measurement
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Focusing on overarching categories of “realistic” and “symbolic” threats may be
problematic. For example, qualitative analysis by Landmann and colleagues (2019) found
that when German participants were asked about how refugees and migration may be
potentially threatening to the German populous, participants’ responses spanned six
different subcategories of threat: concerns over cultural differences, economic strain,
criminality, societal conflicts, prejudice, and caring for refugees. Consequently, some
researchers have begun to suggest that using overarching “realistic” and “symbolic”
threat categories may be obscuring critical, empirically distinct relationships between
subcategories of threat. Numerous studies now suggest that safety threats (e.g., threats to
physical safety and wellbeing or terrorism) are conceptually and empirically distinct from
other realistic threats like economic stability or political power (Cottrell & Neuberg,
2005; Crawford, 2014; Hellman et al., 2021; Landmann et al., 2019; Nueberg & Cottrell,
2002). For instance, across three studies, Crawford (2014) tested whether realistic,
symbolic, and safety threats mediated the effects between political ideology (IV) and
political intolerance and prejudice (DVs). Crawford found that the three threats mediated
these effects in different ways: symbolic threat perception was found to mediate
prejudicial outcome variables for both left- and right-wing groups (for both feeling
thermometers and social distancing measures) but had no effect on political intolerance;
realistic threat mediated prejudice only for left-wing groups and political intolerance for
only right-wing groups; and safety threat mediated the social distancing measure for both
groups and mediated political intolerance for only left-wing groups (Crawford, 2014).
Altogether, Crawford concluded that these findings suggest that there are important
differences in the processes by which certain prejudicial attitudes and behaviors may

14
arise (2014)—not all threats are created equal. These results indicate that examining the
individual subcategories of realistic and symbolic threats is important for fully
understanding the antecedents and consequences of threat perceptions. If the
aforementioned studies had only investigated subsuming categories of threats—namely,
realistic and symbolic threats—the unique causes and correlates to perceptions of safety
threat would have been obfuscated. Nuances like these will only be revealed when more
studies investigate various subcategories of realistic and symbolic threats. Therefore, this
proposal will investigate multiple different subcategories of both realistic and symbolic
threats.
How Groups Perceive Threat
How a group perceives threat is dependent on the type of group they are.
Traditionally, intergroup threat theory theoretical models posit that status differences
serve as an antecedent to threat perceptions (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 1999;
Stephan et al., 2000; Stephan et al., 2015), whereby low-status groups are more likely to
experience threats to their group and high-status groups tend to react more strongly to
threats when they are perceived (since they have more resources, power, and status to
lose and have the resources necessary to respond to threats with force; Stephan et al.,
2000; Stephan et al., 2015). In fact, research has found that the relationship between
threat perception and prejudicial intergroup attitudes is stronger for high-status groups
than it is for low-status groups (Johnson et al., 2005; Riek et al., 2006), suggesting that
when high-status groups perceive threats, they may have a stronger response to those
threats. This is particularly important when it comes to thinking about intergroup
relations in the United States. High-status groups like Whites in the United States have
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been responsible for increasingly more hate crimes over the last few years (Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 2021; Nakamura, 2021); this trend is likely tied to White
Americans experiencing threats to their status and lashing out in the previously predicted
ways. Therefore, it is more important than ever to investigate how and when these threats
are triggered in high-status groups like Whites in the United States.
Another important aspect of threat perception is the relative size of outgroups.
Research suggests that groups are more likely to perceive an outgroup as threatening
when they believe that the outgroup is larger in size (Campbell, 2006; Corneille, Yzerbyt,
Rogier, & Buidin, 2001; McLaren, 2003; Nadeau et al., 1993; Quillian, 1995; Schaller &
Abeysinghe, 2006). These findings are highlighted by the former Trump administration
describing asylum-seeking migrants as an “invasion of illegals, [coming] through large
caravans” which include “many gang members and some very bad people” (Trump,
January 31, 2019; Trump, October 29, 2018); the rhetoric used to describe these asylum
seekers exaggerated their relative size and their capacity to threaten American lives. In
fact, researchers in Germany found that exclusionary attitudes towards immigrants were
not predicted by the actual proportion of immigrants within the country, rather, they were
predicted by the perceived proportion of immigrants (Semyonov et al., 2004). Therefore,
the Trump administration’s rhetoric about migrants was even more dangerous because
the actual number of migrants would not have as much impact on attitudes towards the
migrants as did the administration’s exaggerations of their numbers. Furthermore, it may
be the perception of relative competition that plays a critical role in threat perception.
Some research argues that it is when high-powered groups, like White Americans, view
relatively low-powered outgroups as being highly competitive for scarce resources that
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they will perceive high levels of threat (Esses et al., 2001; Zárate et al., 2004). It is likely
that an outgroup with relatively few members will not be perceived as threatening
because they would not have the collective resources necessary to serve as true
competition to the ingroup; whereas an outgroup believed to have more members may be
able to amass the resources necessary to compete effectively against the ingroup—
serving as a greater threat.
Altogether, this provides the “perfect storm” for White Americans to perceive
racial and ethnic minorities as threats in the United States. White Americans are a highpowered group within the American context and therefore have a lot of resources at risk
to outgroup members. Furthermore, real and embellished narratives of demographic
changes within the United States are painting White Americans as a dwindling minority
group (Frey, 2021; Vespa et al., 2020). These narratives can make racial and ethnic
minorities appear to be a larger, homogenous outgroup that is more competitive against a
White racial ingroup. For instance, this has fueled White supremacist and nationalist
rhetoric regarding “The Great Replacement” theory—or the conspiracy theory that the
White population is being systematically replaced by mass immigration and low White
birthrates (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.; Hsu, 2009). In line with cultural inertia
theory, these narratives are threatening to Whites as they portray a shift away from the
established White majority, moving a stable cultural White hegemony into motion by a
growing population of racial and ethnical minorities. Unfortunately, this rhetoric has
dangerous outcomes as The Great Replacement rhetoric is believed to have largely
contributed to the January 6th Capitol insurrection (Pape, 2021) and to terrorist attacks
like the one recently committed in Buffalo, New York (Bowman et al., 2022). Although
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this rhetoric was once believed to be an isolated and extreme viewpoint, it has gained
mainstream traction in recent years (Daniels, 2009; Graham, 2016; Hartzell, 2018; Klein,
2012) and can contribute to adverse and sometimes deadly outcomes.
Reactance to Threats
Perceptions of threat can sometimes spur reactance to the threat. Psychological
reactance literature proposes that people are motivated to restore threatened or actual
losses of freedoms (Brehm, 1966; Miron & Brehm, 2006). In this view, threats can be
thought of as perceived restrictions to one’s choices or freedom. For example, an
economic threat of immigration could be perceived as a restriction of ones’ freedom or
ability to pursue certain careers due to increased competition for jobs. The degree of
reactance depends on the importance and magnitude of the threatened freedom (Brehm,
1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). This mirrors cultural inertia theory, which submits that
perceived threats are met with “equal and opposite” reactions. Consequently, perceptions
of both realistic and symbolic threats can lead to attitudinal and behavioral outcomes
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan et al., 2015), of particular importance to this proposal
are blind resistance and the restriction to outgroup freedoms.
Blind Resistance. One potential reaction to perceived threat is blind resistance, or
an abject refusal to engage in a prescribed attitude or behavior (Brehm, 1966; Brehm &
Brehm, 1981). Blind resistance can result in what is termed the boomerang effect, or the
adoption of beliefs, attitudes, or stances opposite of the perceived threat to freedom
(Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Sensenig & Brehm, 1968). This can manifest in changing or
strengthening negative attitudes towards an outgroup in order to psychologically distance
the ingroup from the outgroup (Miron & Brehm, 2006). For instance, research has found
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that perceptions that Black students were realistic and/or symbolic threats (that Black
students were competition within the university and were changing the culture) was
significantly related to White student’s negative attitudes towards the group (e.g., beliefs
that the Black students were undeserving) (Stephan et al., 2002). In effect, this helps to
psychologically distance the White ingroup from the threatening outgroup by adopting
beliefs which degrade the outgroup (that the outgroup was undeserving of resources) and
(in)advertently bolster the ingroup (believing that White students are deserving of their
place at the University). Furthermore, blind resistance to threat can manifest as
intolerance or hatred towards and even dehumanization of the threatening outgroup
(Shamir & SagivSchifter, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004). Engaging in blind
resistance towards the outgroup may serve an ingroup protecting function by
psychologically distancing the ingroup from the outgroup through negative beliefs,
attitudes, or stances about the outgroup. In essence, blind resistance towards the outgroup
may help to restore ingroup esteem through the belief that the ingroup is good and
deserving of their resources or power while asserting that the outgroup is bad and
undeserving of the same resources or power (Lam & Seaton, 2016; Viki & Calitri, 2008).
Looking towards the intergroup threat theory literature, we can see that there is
some debate about which types of threat perceptions may contribute to blind resistance in
the form of negative or prejudicial attitudes about the outgroup. For instance, a metaanalysis of 95 research samples investigating this very question demonstrated that both
realistic (r = .42, p < .05) and symbolic (r = .45, p < .05) threat perceptions led to
increased negative attitudes about the threatening outgroup (Riek et al., 2006). On the
other hand, Stephan and colleagues (2005) found that students who were told that

19
immigrants were either realistic or symbolic threats did not differ from the no-threat
condition on their negative attitudes toward the immigrant outgroup; rather, this study
found that it was the combined effect—informing student participants that immigrants
were both realistic and symbolic threats—that significantly increased negative attitudes
towards the immigrant outgroup. Similarly, studies utilizing a unified threat measure
(including both realistic and symbolic threat items) found that perceptions that an
outgroup was a general threat to the ingroup led to increased reports of negative attitudes
about the outgroup (Atwell & Mastro, 2016; Oswald, 2005). Whereas the meta-analysis
suggested that both realistic and symbolic threats have somewhat equivalent relationships
to outgroup attitudes and other studies would suggest that it may be the combination of
realistic and symbolic threats which influence outgroup attitudes, other studies suggest
that one type of threat (realistic or symbolic) may be more influential than the other threat
on outgroup attitudes. When tested simultaneously within an analysis, some studies find
that realistic threats, but not symbolic threats, predict outgroup attitudes (Bizman &
Yinon, 2001); however, other studies found that it was symbolic threat, but not realistic
threat, that predicted outgroup attitudes (McLaren, 2003; Sniderman et al., 2004; Tausch
et al., 2007; Velasco Gonzalez et al., 2010). Altogether, this literature suggests that threat
perception likely increases negative outgroup attitudes; however, it is unclear whether
realistic or symbolic threats have a greater effect on this outcome.
While studies on blind resistance to threats typically examine negative outgroup
attitudes, few study increased belief in ingroup superiority and deservedness which may
go hand-in-hand with blind resistance motivations. For instance, Eidelson and Eidelson
(2003) posit that ingroup superiority and injustice beliefs are key belief domains which
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help to shape perceptions of group conflicts—causing ingroups to judge outgroups more
harshly, especially when those outgroups do not act in accordance with the ingroups’
inflated self-image. In fact, Voci (2006) found that when ingroup value was threatened
(hearing that the ingroup was characterized by negative traits), participants trusted the
ingroup more and this led to increased ingroup evaluations and participants actively
distrusting the outgroup, increasing their outgroup derogation. This pattern of results
proposes that a threatened ingroup may take two courses of action: 1) reestablish ingroup
status and 2) derogate and reduce the status of the outgroup. Furthermore, Jardina (2021)
found that White Americans’ presidential evaluations (who they would vote for and how
positively the candidate was viewed) were driven in large part by attitudes towards racial
outgroups and were also driven by positive White racial ingroup identification. In other
words, political preferences, like who is viewed as capable of leading and protecting the
nation, may be informed by both negative outgroup and positive ingroup beliefs and
evaluations. Together these studies suggest that ingroup enhancement or positive ingroup
evaluations may be an important factor to consider in response to group threat. Therefore,
the current proposal will build upon this literature by examining White nationalism
beliefs, or the belief that the White race is a superior racial group deserving of special
treatment, in response to White ingroup threat perception.
Restriction of Outgroup Freedom. Another potential reaction to the perception
of threat is the restriction of others’ freedoms. In essence, restriction of a threatening
outgroup’s freedoms is an attempt to restore the ingroup’s freedoms and social standing
(Brehm & Brehm, 1981). This strategy attempts to alleviate reactance to threats through
lashing out against other groups and restricting their freedoms. Research investigating
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political and national conflicts finds that feeling victimized can promote conflictexacerbating attitudes and behaviors towards an outgroup such as support for extreme
conflict-inducing policies and militaristic interventions (Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Maoz
& Eidelson, 2007; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). For example, the more Israeli-Jews saw
their ingroup as being a vulnerable and victimized group, the more likely they were to
support extreme policies against the outgroup such as removing Palestinians from the
West Bank and Gaza Strip (Maoz & Eidelson, 2007). This may suggest that support for
outgroup restricting policies (such as unilaterally deciding the fate of Palestinians) stems
from feelings that the ingroup itself is vulnerable, restricted, or victimized. Therefore, the
perception that an outgroup can pose a threat to the ingroup is alleviated through support
for policies which make it more difficult for the outgroup to pose any threat to the
ingroup.
Similar to blind resistance, the intergroup threat theory literature offers little
consensus regarding which threats (realistic, symbolic, or both) are related to increased
support for outgroup restricting policies. A study by Chiricos and colleagues (2014)
found that both realistic and symbolic threat perceptions exerted a similar influence on
support for stricter policies against undocumented immigration. However, a different
segment of the literature has suggested that realistic threats have a greater influence on
outgroup restriction than symbolic threats (Guillermo et al., 2021; Jetten et al., 2017;
Jones et al., 2021; Pereira et al., 2010; Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015; Wohl et al., 2010;
Vala et al., 2006). For instance, the perceived threat of ingroup extinction (a realistic
threat) has been shown to increase opposition to immigration (Jetten et al., 2017;
Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015; Wohl et al., 2010). Furthermore, studies like those done by
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Pereira and colleagues (2010) found that across 21 European countries, realistic threat
perception was a stronger mediator in the relationship between prejudice and opposition
to immigration than was symbolic threat. Similarly, Vala and colleagues (2006) found
that economic threat, followed by security threat, were the best predictors of opposition
to immigration. Conversely, a separate segment of the literature suggests that symbolic
threat perception has a greater influence on outgroup restriction when compared to
realistic threats (Makashvili et al., 2018; Renfro et al., 2006; Rios et al., 2018; Quezada et
al., 2011). For example, Rios and colleagues (2021) had participants read a vignette in
which a coworker wanted to express their religious beliefs at work and then rated their
potential response to the request; results indicated that participants were less likely to
allow this religious expression when perceiving symbolic threat than when perceiving
realistic threat. A recent metanalysis of 163 effect size estimates examining threat
perceptions’ impact on support for outgroup human rights and civil liberties found that
combined measures of realistic and symbolic threats had stronger effects on outgroup
restrictions than did realistic or symbolic threat measures alone (Carriere et al., 2022).
Altogether, the current threat perception literature offers conflicting evidence regarding
which threats are more related to outgroup restricting policy support. Thus, the current
proposal will extend this literature by examining White Americans’ support for outgroup
restricting policies in light of various threat perceptions.
Threat Perception in the Wake of Cultural Change
Population, or demographic, changes are a hallmark of social and cultural change
(Esses et al., 2001; Haferkamp, & Smelser, 1992). Consequently, as the racial makeup of
the United States continues to change, with estimates that by midcentury Whites in the
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United States will comprise less than 50% of the overall population (Frey, 2018; Vespa et
al., 2020), some White Americans appear to feel threatened. This recent uptick in concern
over demographic change is in-line with the same anxieties White Americans have held
regarding demographic changes over the last century (McVeigh & Estep, 2019). In other
words, demographic changes have served as a harbinger of new beliefs, ways of life, and
cultural norms that may threaten the White majority’s cultural control. Since perceived
changes to cultural stability are threatening to dominant group members (e.g., White
Americans; Wohl, et al., 2010) and since the American identity is often conflated with a
White American identity (Devos, 2006; Devos & Banaji, 2005; Dovidio et al., 2010), it is
unsurprising that some White Americans are threatened by the implications of
demographic change.
Population Shifts as Cultural Inertia
Research has begun to examine White Americans’ reactions to the recent
demographic changes and projections in the United States. This literature typically uses
the population shift (a.k.a. majority-minority shift) paradigm to prime participants with a
cultural change in the form of demographic change (Craig & Richeson, 2014a, 2014b).
The population shift paradigm typically shows participants one of two created news
articles: the demographic shift article presents information about demographic changes
occurring in the nation—usually providing real U.S. Census Bureau data showing that
Whites in the U.S. will comprise less than 50% of the population by midcentury; whereas
the control article typically presents information about population changes that are
neutral to the White population—usually involving information about people moving to
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suburbs without specifying demographic characteristics about the population (Craig &
Richeson, 2014a, 2014b).
This paradigm is closely tied to the cultural change literature. Demographic
changes typically bring about cultural changes as cultural change is driven by the group
members participating in and influencing its course (Bachrach, 2014; Johnson-Hanks et
al., 2011). Demographic changes may change culture through changing the electorate
(Cilluffo & Cohn, 2019; Cohn & Caumont, 2016; Craig et al., 2018a), how people work
(Cohn & Caumont, 2016), the composition of a household structure (Cilluffo & Cohn,
2019; Cohn & Caumont, 2016) or introducing or emphasizing new cultural traditions and
values (Silver et al., 2021). In other words, as the general population changes—perhaps
through different age groups or racial/ethnic groups—new ideas and worldviews are
added to the cultural lexicon, making the culture flex to accommodate these new
populations. Therefore, the population shift paradigm is a powerful instantiation of the
larger cultural change and threat perception literatures. Because cultural change usually
occurs over decades and centuries, it can be the perception of cultural change, not
necessarily the reality of cultural change, that is potentially threatening. As a result, the
population shift paradigm, serves as a relatively simple way of simulating real-world
media coverage of demographic trends which naturally imply cultural changes away from
the White majority.
Population Shifts and Threat Perception
The intergroup threat theory literature tells us that dominant group members tend
to be threatened by outgroups—potential change away from the ingroup is threatening
(for a review see Stephan & Stephan, 2013). Therefore, shifts in national demographic
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composition have the potential to threaten dominant group members like Whites in the
United States. In their theoretical framework, Craig and colleagues propose that
perceived threat is a mechanism by which increased diversity causes negative intergroup
relations like prejudice and discrimination against an outgroup (see Figure 1; Craig et al.,
2018b). Within this theoretical model, perceived threat encompasses all forms of threat in
the intergroup threat theory framework, both overarching categories (e.g., realistic and
symbolic threat) and subcategories (e.g., status and cultural threat). This proposal will
focus on a portion of Craig and colleagues’ theoretical model; namely, on the causal
chain between increases in diversity (through demographic changes), perceived threat,
and intergroup relations.
Figure 1
Theoretical Framework for How Increases in Racial Diversity Leads to Intergroup
Relations, Proposed in Craig et al., 2018b.

Note. This paper focuses on only a portion of this overall framework. Specifically, the
current project focuses on how minority group size impacts perceived threat and
intergroup relations, highlighted in red.
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Overarching Measurement of Threat Perception. Similar to the overall
intergroup threat theory literature, the population shift literature has taken several
different approaches to measuring White’s overarching threat perception in the wake of
demographic changes. Nadeau and colleagues (1993) measured threat perception across
both realistic and symbolic threat dimensions (e.g., the outgroup receives preferential
hiring, increases crime, pushes too fast for cultural change, etc.) to create a measure of
overall threat. Whereas some research measured threat in the broadest sense, asking
participants if they were “threatened by growing diversity” trends (Major et al., 2018;
Outten et al., 2012; 2018). These studies found that increased threat perception in
response to demographic changes predicted support for Donald Trump (Major et al.,
2018), support for anti-immigration policies and behaviors (Major et al., 2018; Outten et
al., 2018), negative intergroup emotions (Outten et al., 2012; 2018), and opposition to
political correctness (Major et al., 2018). These studies demonstrate the base assertion
that threat, in general, may be a mechanism by which increases in diversity propel Whites
into adverse intergroup relations.
Other sections of the literature chose to break down general threat perception into
realistic and/or symbolic threat perceptions. These studies measured realistic and
symbolic threat with scales capturing different facets of realistic and symbolic threats.
For instance, Danbold and Huo’s measure of realistic threat included three items
assessing whether the outgroup 1) was a potential tax burden, 2) drained social services,
and 3) took jobs away from ingroup members (2015). Whereas Zou and Cheryan
measured realistic threat by asking participants whether the outgroup would 1)
outperform Whites academically, 2) surpass them financially, 3) become tax burdens, 4)
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displace White workers from jobs, and 5) endanger the community (2021). Looking at
symbolic threat measurement, Bai and Federico used three items in their symbolic threat
scale, one assessing incompatible morals, one assessing incompatible work ethic, and
another assessing whether outgroups undermine American culture (2021). Similarly,
Danbold and Huo (2015) and Osborn and colleagues (2020) measured symbolic threat
using items assessing whether outgroups threaten White Americans’ core values.
These population shift studies using realistic and symbolic threat measures have
found conflicting evidence for how these threat perceptions predict intergroup relations.
For instance, Osborn and colleagues (2020) tested how interethnic ideologies (e.g.,
multiculturalism, polyculturalism) impacted threat perception. They found that
participants perceived greater realistic, but not symbolic, threat in the population-shift
condition (an abbreviated form of the classic population shift paradigm) compared to the
control condition. Furthermore, they found a significant two-way interaction, such that
within the population-shift condition, participants also exposed to multiculturalism ideas
perceived more realistic threats than those in the control condition; the polyculturalism
condition was nonsignificant (Osborn et al., 2020). These findings are supported by
cultural inertia theory, as those in the multiculturalism condition likely felt the need to
accommodate other cultural perspectives (Plaut et al., 2011), whereas polyculturalism
stresses how cultures are dynamic and constantly being influenced by other groups over
time (Rosenthal & Levy, 2012)—suggesting no accommodation was necessary thus no
threat was perceived. In addition, Danbold and Huo (2015) used adapted intergroup threat
theory measures of realistic and symbolic threat (as well as a newly introduced measure
of prototypicality threat to be discussed in the following section) to test whether these
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threat perceptions mediated the effect of perceived White American population decline
on pro-assimilation attitudes. Results revealed that realistic threat perception, but not
symbolic threat perception, mediated this relationship (Danbold & Huo, 2015). Similarly,
Bai and Federico (2021) tested whether various threat perceptions (status, prototypicality,
symbolic, and collective existential threat) mediated the effects of population shifts on
intergroup relations. In contrast to the two previous studies, Bai and Federico (2021)
found that when White participants were primed with black population growth, symbolic
threat significantly mediated support for extreme right-wing groups and support for
outgroup restricting policies. Together this literature suggests that realistic and symbolic
threat perception may influence intergroup relations. However, similar to intergroup
threat theory literature more generally, the current population shift literature offers
conflicting evidence for the unique effects of realistic and symbolic threat perceptions on
downstream intergroup relations.
Measurement of Threat Perception Subcategories. The population shift
literature has also focused on various subcategories of threat perceptions in response to
demographic changes. For instance, foundational studies on the topic by Craig and
Richeson focused on Whites’ perceptions of status threat (a uniquely mixed threat
perception with elements of both realistic and symbolic threat) in response to
demographic changes (2014a; 2014b). Many subsequent studies on the topic of
demographic changes examined status threat as well (Bai & Federico, 2020; 2021;
Schildkraut & Marotta, 2018; Willer et al., 2016; Zou & Cheryan, 2021). These studies
found that increased perceptions of status threat in response to demographic changes
predicted White participants’ support for conservative politics and policies (Craig &
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Richeson, 2014a; 2014b; Willer et al., 2016), expression of more pro-White racial bias
(Craig & Richeson, 2014a), colder feelings towards racial/ethnic minorities (Craig &
Richeson, 2014a; Schildkraut & Marotta, 2018), support for stricter immigration policies
(Schildkraut & Marotta, 2018), and desire to move away from racially diverse
neighborhoods (Zou & Cheryan, 2021). Somewhat surprisingly, Bai and Federico found
that increased perception of status threat was significantly related to reduced support for
extreme right-wing groups and reduced support for extreme outgroup restricting policies
(2021). Altogether, it appears as though status threat does play a role in intergroup
relations, even if there have been mixed findings around how status threat may influence
these potentially harmful intergroup relations.
Beyond status threat, the population shifts literature has also measured other
subcomponents of threat like prototypicality threat (Bai & Federico, 2021; Danbold &
Huo, 2015; Zou & Cheryan, 2021), culture threat (Zou & Cheryan, 2021), and collective
existential threat (Bai & Federico, 2020, 2021). Prototypicality threat typically refers to
the potential loss of a group’s standing as most representative of a superordinate
category, like the White populous’ prototypicality in the United States (Danbold & Huo,
2015). Studies measuring prototypicality threat in response to demographic shifts found
that, even when measured alongside other realistic and symbolic threats, increased
perceptions of prototypicality threat predicted pro-assimilation attitudes (Danbold & Huo,
2015), less endorsement of diversity measures (Danbold & Huo, 2015), and support for
extreme outgroup restricting policies (Bai & Federico, 2021). Conversely, Zou and
Cheryan did not find significant effects for prototypicality threat in predicting White
Americans’ desire to move from increasingly racially diverse neighborhoods (2021).
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Cultural threat, on the other hand, refers to the potential replacement of the current,
dominant, culture by an outgroup’s culture (Zou & Cheryan, 2021). Across five studies,
Zou and Cheryan found that above and beyond realistic and symbolic threat perceptions,
cultural threat perception predicted White Americans’ desire to avoid living in racially
diverse neighborhoods (2021). Finally, collective existential threat refers to the potential
that the ingroup will cease to exist (Hirschberger et al., 2016; Wohl et al., 2010). Studies
measuring collective existential threat have found that, above and beyond other realistic
and symbolic threats, collective existential threat predicted White participants’ support
for extreme right-wing groups and extreme outgroup restricting policies (Bai & Federico,
2020; 2021).
Together, these studies would suggest that it is important to examine the unique
influence various subcategories of threat may have on the relationship between cultural
changes and intergroup relations. In nearly all of the presented studies, the various
subcategories of threat perception had unique effects above and beyond that of realistic
and/or symbolic threat perceptions—indicating that realistic and symbolic threat may not
be fully capturing or explaining what is causing these kinds of intergroup relations.
Therefore, as a way of extending the current literature and testing the conceptual overlap
between various threat perceptions, I will test the effects of various subcategories of
threat perception within a single study. This will help to determine if certain threats are
playing an outsized role in generating the instability White Americans are feeling in
response to demographic change. Understanding the most important threats contributing
to high-status group angst is important, particularly when it comes to intergroup relations
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like White Americans’ support for White nationalism beliefs and outgroup restricting
policies.
Gaps in the Literature
The current literature has found that cultural change is threatening to White
Americans and these threats—both realistic and symbolic—can lead to many negative
intergroup relations. In fact, a relatively recent review of this literature succinctly
concludes that there is “clear evidence that white Americans (i.e., the current racial
majority) experience the impending “majority-minority” shift as a threat to their
dominant (social, economic, political, and cultural) status” (Craig et al., 2018a, p. 206).
Unfortunately, the current literature does not allow us to draw conclusions far beyond
that threat, in general, is playing a role in various reactions to cultural change. The
measurement of threat perceptions has been variable within the literature,
operationalizations of various threats have differed and often led to conceptual overlaps
between types of threat. Because of this, it is unclear if certain threats are playing an
outsized role in generating negative intergroup relations.
Furthermore, most research investigating threat perceptions is largely
correlational in nature or disproportionately focuses on some threats over others. For
instance, Reik and colleagues’ meta-analysis on 95 samples investigating intergroup
threat theory found that there was a notable lack of experimental studies manipulating
realistic and symbolic threat (2006). The few samples which did manipulate threat, rarely
manipulated realistic threat (only three samples) (2006). A more recent analysis of the
intergroup threat theory literature suggests that although the amount of experimental and
quasi-experimental intergroup threat theory studies has increased, there is still ample
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room to investigate the nuances in relationship between threat perceptions and intergroup
relations (Rios et al., 2018). Looking more specifically at the literature investigating
threat perception in response to cultural change, even fewer experimental or quasiexperimental studies are found.
Although correlational research can be extremely useful and beneficial for
establishing base relationships between variables, experimental research is critical for
demonstrating proposed causal relationships between variables (Spencer et al., 2005).
Take, for instance, the proposed model that threat serves as a mediator in the relationship
between demographic changes and negative outgroup relations (Craig & Richeson,
2018). Most studies testing this model manipulate demographic changes and then
measure threat perception and outgroup relations (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014a). Within
these studies, it is difficult to determine whether the demographic changes were
increasing threat perception which, in turn, increased negative racial attitudes (proposed
in Craig & Richeson, 2014a) or whether it may be the increase in negative racial attitudes
which causes the increase in perceiving those outgroups as a threat. Craig and Richeson
(2014b) did experimentally manipulate threat perception in one study by reassuring
White participants that demographic shifts occurring in the nation were not going to
affect their societal status, stating that “White Americans are expected to continue to have
higher average incomes and wealth compared to members of other racial groups”
(assuaged-threat condition, pp. 1193). Results from this threat manipulation indicated that
those in the status-threat condition demonstrated greater support for conservative policies
than those in the assuaged-threat condition or control (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). This
finding supports Craig and Richeson’s proposed causal model; however, it should be
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tested under different conditions. With only the single study manipulating threat
perception, we cannot be sure whether this means all threats mediate the relationship
between demographic changes and outgroup relations or whether it is status threat and, in
particular, how Craig and Richeson chose to operationalize status threat, which may serve
as a mediator but not other forms of threat. This is critical to determine as it can help to
guide intervention strategies. Knowing whether it is specific forms of threat which cause
downstream negative intergroup relations or whether it is threat, in general, would help to
determine which threats should be targeted for interventions; for instance, if economic
threat (but not safety threat) was found to be a causal force, the government could
prioritize campaigns to reassure the public that immigrants are not stealing American jobs
or adversely effecting local economic conditions while not wasting funds on campaigns
addressing less consequential threat perceptions.
Rationale
With the troubling increase in White hate groups and hate crimes committed over
the past 6 years (Kunzelman & Galvan, 2019; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2019), there
has been a flurry of research aimed at understanding what is fueling the growing
animosity within some White Americans. The current literature can provide some
answers. In line with cultural inertia theory, cultural changes—like the demographic
changes in the U.S.—have increased perceptions of both realistic and symbolic threats in
White Americans; demographic changes are propelling a stable White American culture
into motion, a threatening notion for some White folk. These threat perceptions are not
nominal, White nationalism is founded on a belief that Whites are deserving of greatness
but that cultural forces are devaluing or eliminating White influence (Reyna et al., 2022);
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therefore, Whites’ threat response to cultural change may have dangerous downstream
consequences in the form of support for White nationalism. In fact, these threat
perceptions have been shown to increase support for extreme right-wing groups (like
White nationalists) and support for extreme policies (Bai & Federico, 2021). Therefore,
this potential shift in cultural stability, signaled through demographic changes, may be
met with an “equal and opposite” reaction of bolstering an extreme version of ingroup
White identity (White nationalism) and support for outgroup restrictions.
The existing literature has provided a foundation on which we can build a clearer
understanding of how cultural change can threaten the White majority and cause negative
intergroup relations. I believe there are two ways to improve the current literature:
measure a multitude of threats simultaneously to determine their unique relationships to
cultural change and its downstream consequences; and experimentally manipulated threat
perception in light cultural change. More than ever, I believe we need to focus on
understanding the unique causes of White hate. With the existing literature as a guide, we
can begin to understand how presenting cultural change information to White Americans
may or may not exacerbate perceptions of threat and reactions to those threats. In doing
so, we will be able to craft more targeted interventions to stop the growing hate we are
seeing in the country.
The Current Research
Outlined here is a three-study investigation of the various ways cultural change
may cause threat perception and how this threat perception may relate to support for
White nationalism beliefs and for outgroup restricting policies. Study 1 served several
purposes. Study 1 pilot tested the threat items and determine the relationships between
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cultural change, the different threat perceptions, and the dependent variables. This
allowed for the more accurate manipulation of threat within Study 2a and Study 2b. After
establishing the most critical threat variables, I experimentally manipulated the most
important threat variables in conjunction with the cultural change information. Study 2a
pilot tested the threat manipulations and Study 2b utilized the threat manipulations to
determine whether causal relationships existed between threat perception and White
nationalism beliefs and outgroup restricting policy support.
Study 1
Accumulating evidence indicates that cultural change increases threat perception
in White Americans (e.g., Bai & Federico, 2021; Danbold & Huo, 2015). However,
previous research has used different measures of threat perception and has found
inconsistent results. Therefore, Study 1 utilized the population shift paradigm to replicate
the causal relationship between cultural changes and threat perception found in previous
research (e.g., Craig & Richeson, 2014a). Furthermore, Study 1 expanded the
measurement of threat perception to include various subcategories of realistic and
symbolic threat. Study 1 aimed to establish the baseline relationships between the cultural
change manipulation, threat perception, and support for White nationalism beliefs and
outgroup restricting policies.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis I
I predicted that the cultural change manipulation would have a positive
relationship with threat perception, such that participants in the cultural change
manipulation would endorse the threat measures more than those in the control condition.
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Research Question
Research Question I
How do the subcategories of threats relate to White nationalism beliefs and
outgroup restricting policies? For instance, do perceived threats to power and social
status have a greater impact on support for White nationalism beliefs than perceived
threats to economic opportunities? Due to the inconsistent findings within the previous
literature, these analyses were exploratory and informed Study 2b’s hypotheses.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through Prolific, an online crowdsourcing website
created for academic, user, and market research. I requested a Prolific sample of selfidentified White United States residents, at least 50% of which self-identified as
conservative (as many of the study’s critical variables are strongly correlated with
political ideology). An a priori power analysis was conducted using the semPower
package (Moshagen & Erdfelder, 2016) in R (R Core Team, 2021). Specifying an alpha
of .05, power of .80, model degrees of freedom of 4, and the RMSEA effect measure with
an effect of .07, an appropriate sample size would be 611 participants. Ultimately,
however, sample size was determined based on procured funding which did not allow for
the needed sample size. Funding allowed for the recruitment of 313 participants. After
data cleaning, the final sample consisted of 290 participants (aged 18 - 92, M = 32.20, SD
= 12.80; political ideology (-3 = very liberal to +3 = very conservative) M = 0.03, SD =
2.12; 47.6% female, 49.7% male, 2.8% nonbinary; income M = $65,900, SD = $42,500;
14.8% with a high school degree or less, 33.1% with some college or a 2-year degree,
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26.2% with a bachelor’s degree, and 24.8% with a graduate degree). Participants were
paid $1.10 for their successful completion of the 10-minute survey.
Procedure
Prolific participants that met requirements (e.g., White, United States residents)
viewed the study posting online. If they were interested in participating in the study, they
could click into the Qualtrics survey and read the information sheet; the information sheet
stated that the study would involve participants giving their opinions on a recent news
article and about their general attitudes and opinions on recent political and social issues.
The information sheet also detailed the participants’ time commitment, compensation,
anonymity, and potential risks and benefits of participating in the research. They either
clicked that they agreed to participate in the survey, or they were redirected back to
Prolific’s website.
Participants who agreed to participate in the survey began by filling out a short
demographics section (age, sex, race, income, education, and political identification) to
ease them into participation. Next, participants were asked to read a recently published
news article and answer questions afterwards about their opinions on the article. This
article served as the study’s cultural change manipulation (described below). The “Next”
button was programmed to display after one minute on the article page so that
participants could not immediately skip past the manipulation. After reading the article,
participants answered a manipulation check question regarding their condition and then
answered several opinion questions about the article to help confirm the cover story.
After this section of the survey, participants were informed that they would now answer
questions about their opinions and attitudes towards recent political and social issues in
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the United States. These questions included threat measures (realistic and symbolic), a
White nationalism measure, and policy questions about immigration and minority rights.
Each participant saw the threat measures first and then saw the White nationalism and
policy measures in a random order. Finally, participants read the debriefing sheet which
informed them of the purpose of the study and were compensated for their participation
(see Appendix F for the full survey).
Measures
Cultural Change Manipulation. The cultural change manipulation adapted
openly available materials originally created to measure White Americans’ reactions to
demographic changes (Craig & Richeson, 2014a; 2014b; 2018). Participants were asked
to read one of two articles—one detailed real demographic projections that racial
minorities will constitute more than 50% of the population in the United States by 2042
(cultural change condition) and the other article detailed increasing geographic mobility
of people in the United States (control condition) (see Appendix A for the complete
articles). The cultural change condition was intended to prime White participants with a
cultural change away from the White majority; the control condition was intended to be a
neutral cultural change for the White participants.
Manipulation Check and Cover Story Items. One item assessed whether
participants correctly identified their assigned condition, “Which of the following
statements best describes the topic of the article you just read?”. The responses included
the following randomly ordered options: “Racial demographic changes are occurring in
the U.S.”, “Geographic mobility is increasing with people moving to suburbs”, “The new
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presidential administration has made economic policy changes”, and “Solar, wind, and
other clean energy sources are increasing in popularity”.
Participants were then asked several questions to confirm the cover story of
evaluating the article they read. Items included, “How interesting was the article you
read?” and “How much do you trust the author of the article?”. Both items were
measured on a 7-point scale (0, Not interesting at all/Not at all - 6, Extremely
interesting/Completely). Finally, there was one open-response question asking
participants, “Think about the article you read. Do you think there will be consequences
from the changes you read about? If so, what do you think those consequences will be?
How would the U.S. change as a result? If not, why don’t these changes matter?”.
Realistic Threat. The realistic threat measure assessed participants’ perception of
various realistic threats. Some of the realistic threat items were adapted from previous
threat measures (Bai & Federico, 2021; Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Lucassen & Lubbers,
2012; Maddux et al., 2008; Outten, et al., 2012; Stephan et al., 1999); other items were
created to ensure that the measure equally addressed the various subcategories of realistic
threat (e.g., power, job security, safety, etc). There were 3-4 items addressing each
subcategory of realistic threat, for a total of 19 items. All items were modified to be about
“racial/ethnic minorities” to standardize the outgroup within the items. All items were
rated on a 7-point scale (-3, strongly disagree – +3, strongly agree). For an overview of
all initial realistic threat items see Table 1.
Threat to Social Status & Power. The realistic threat items that assessed social
status and power threat included: “If racial/ethnic minorities increase in numbers, it will
lower the status of Whites in America”; “Racial/ethnic minorities have too much
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influence in American society”; “Racial/ethnic minorities are gaining too much political
power in the United States”; and “Whites hold too many positions of power in the United
States” (reverse scored).
Threat to Economic Opportunities: The realistic threat items that assessed threats
to economic opportunities included: “Racial/ethnic minorities are taking economic
opportunities away from Whites in America (e.g., jobs, loans)”; “Racial/ethnic minorities
are taking jobs away from Whites”; “Social services have become less available to White
because of racial/ethnic minorities”; and “Racial/ethnic minorities have fewer economic
opportunities in America compared to Whites” (reverse scored).
Threat to Safety: The realistic threat items that assessed threats to safety
included: “I am fearful for my safety when I am near racial/ethnic minorities”;
“Racial/ethnic minorities make communities less safe”; “Racial/ethnic minorities threaten
law and order in the Unites States”; and “The vast majority of racial/ethnic minorities are
law abiding citizens” (reverse scored).
Collective Existential Threat: The realistic threat items that assessed collective
existential threat included: “It is likely that the White race won’t exist in the future”;
“The existence of the White race is in jeopardy”; and “Whites will remain the dominant
group in America for a very long time” (reverse scored).
Threat to Education: The realistic threat items that assessed threats to
educational attainment included: “Racial/ethnic minorities make it harder for White to get
into good schools”; “Schools spend too many on their racial/ethnic minority students”;
“The education system benefits racial/ethnic minorities more than Whites in America”;
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and “White students are given better educational opportunities compared to racial/ethnic
minority students” (reverse scored).
Table 1
Complete List of Realistic Threat Items

Note: * indicates a reverse-scored item.
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Symbolic Threat. The symbolic threat measure assessed participants’ perceptions
of various symbolic threats. Some of the symbolic threat items were adapted from
previous threat measures (Bai & Federico, 2021; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012; Stephan et
al., 1999, 2002); other items were created to ensure that the measure equally addressed
the various subcategories of symbolic threat (e.g., morality, culture, prototypicality).
There were 4 items addressing each subcategory of symbolic threat, for a total of 12
items. All items were modified to be about “racial/ethnic minorities” to standardize the
outgroup within the items. All items were rated on a 7-point scale (-3, strongly disagree –
+3, strongly agree). For an overview of the initial symbolic threat items, see Table 2.
Threat to Prototypicality. The symbolic threat items that assessed threats to
prototypicality included: “Racial/ethnic minorities pose a threat to what it means to be
American”; “Racial/ethnic minorities do not represent the American identity”; “Due to
demographic changes, I fear that in the future it won’t be clear what it means to be
American”; and “Racial/ethnic minorities make positive contributions to the American
identity” (reverse scored).
Threat to Culture and Values. The symbolic threat items that assessed threats to
culture and values included: “Racial/ethnic minorities do not have the same work ethic as
most Americans”; “Racial/ethnic minorities don’t respect American culture”;
“Racial/ethnic minorities violate traditional American family values”; and “Cultural
diversity makes the United States stronger” (reverse scored).
Threat to Moral Standards. The symbolic threat items that assessed threats to
moral standards included: “Racial/ethnic minorities contribute to the moral decline in
American society” “Racial/ethnic minorities do not adhere to American moral standards”;
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“Racial/ethnic minorities have lower moral standards than Whites in America”; and
“Racial/ethnic minorities live by the same moral standards as Whites in America”
(reverse scored).
Table 2
Complete List of Symbolic Threat Items

Note: * indicates a reverse-scored item.
White Nationalism. Support for White nationalism beliefs was measured using a
5-item measure (Bellovary & Reyna, 2020). Items included: “Multiculturalism is the
biggest threat to White America”; “I am sympathetic to organizations/groups that bring
attention to White concerns”; “White American culture is what makes this country great”;
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“One of the problems with America is the decline of Whiteness”; and “In order to
maintain White status, it is sometimes necessary to use violence towards racial/ethnic
minority groups”. All items were rated on a 7-point scale (-3, strongly disagree – +3,
strongly agree). The measure has demonstrated good internal consistency across several
previous studies: White MTurk sample 1: α = .92, ω = .92 (Harris, et al., 2021); White
MTurk sample 2: α = .87, ω = .87 (Bellovary & Reyna, 2020); White Dynata sample: α =
.86, ω = .86 (Reyna, 2021).
Outgroup Restricting Policies. Support for outgroup restricting policies was
measured using 12 items; half of these items were about immigrant restrictions and the
other half were about minority group restrictions. Some of these policies were taken from
existing work (Craig & Richeson, 2014b). All items were rated on a 7-point scale (-3,
strongly disagree – +3, strongly agree). For an overview of the outgroup restricting items
see Table 3.
Immigration Policies. The six items oriented towards immigrant group
restrictions included: “In order to deter illegal immigration, the government should
separate immigrant children from their parents”; “The U.S. government should
unconditionally ban immigrants from countries deemed dangerous”; “Immigrants to the
United States should be required to speak English”; “The amount of foreign immigration
from Europe to the United States should be increased”; “Legal immigrants should have
full access to jobs and resources (e.g., education, healthcare) when they arrive in the
United States” (reverse scored); and “The amount of foreign immigration from Latin
American to the United States should be increased” (reverse scored).
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Minority Policies. The six items oriented towards minority group restrictions
included: “Increasing police patrols in racial/ethnic minority communities is necessary to
lower crime”; “The government does not owe any special treatment to racial/ethnic
minorities for discrimination their racial group experienced in the past”; “The
government should use the military to control rallies/protests that promote racial/ethnic
minority causes (e.g., Black Lives Matter)”; “Employers should take extra steps to
diversify their employees when making hiring and promotion decisions” (reverse scored);
“Schools should teach the history of racial/ethnic minority groups in America to the same
degree as White history” (reverse scored); and “The government should spend more
money on schools in racial/ethnic minority neighborhoods” (reverse scored).
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Table 3
Complete List of Outgroup Restricting Policy Items

Note: * indicates a reverse-scored item.
Attention Check. There was one attention check item included in the survey: “In
America, please select ‘Somewhat agree’ if you are paying attention”. Participants
needed to select the requested response to be considered “attentive”.
Results
Data Cleaning
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Each participant response was checked for noncompliance and ineligibility.
Participants who failed the attention check were removed from the analysis (N = 13).
People who incorrectly identified their condition via the manipulation check item were
removed from the analysis (N = 5). Finally, people who identified as nonwhite were
removed from analysis (N = 5)3. After removing these ineligible or noncompliant
participants, the final sample size was 290.
Data missingness did not exceed 10% (missingness was 0.22%). In fact, 92% of
the sample was not missing any data. Therefore, missing data was imputed using mean
imputation.
Scale Construction
To determine the factor structure of the proposed measures, confirmatory factor
analyses (CFA) were conducted for all measures using full information maximum
likelihood. A CFA was considered a good fit if it met the fit criteria for at least 3 of the
following fit indices: CFI, TLI, SRMR, and RMSEA4. If the fit was poor, a follow-up
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted to determine the best factor structure for
the items. Follow-up EFAs were conducted using principal axis factoring with oblimin
rotation and retained Eigenvalues greater than one.
Threat Scales Construction. A confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on
all threat items using an eight-factor solution based on the theoretically proposed factor
structure (see Appendix B, Table B1). The CFA results indicated a poor fit (CFI = 0.89,

3

Participants on Prolific may identify as multiple races within their prescreening survey; this prescreening
survey dictates which Prolific participants are allowed to enter prescreened surveys. These participants
were likely multiracial and were more closely identifying with their nonwhite racial identity at the time of
participation.
4

CFI ≥ 0.90, TLI ≥ 0.95, SRMR < 0.08, RMSEA < 0.08
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TLI = 0.88, SRMR = 0.07, RMSEA = 0.08 [0.08, 0.09]). Since the CFA only met criteria
for the SRMR fit index, a follow-up EFA was conducted. The follow-up EFA resulted in
an unbalanced and theoretically inconsistent two-factor structure (see Appendix B, Table
B2). All but 6 threat items loaded onto a single factor, four of the remaining threat items
loaded onto a second factor, and two existential threat items remained unloaded onto
either factor. These two CFA and EFA factor structures were unsatisfactory.
A reevaluation of the initial eight-factor CFA revealed that the lowest loadings on
each factor were the reverse-scored items. Research finds that reverse-scored items are
problematic in scale construction, leading to worse model fit and unreliably estimates
(Dueber et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2016). In light of these findings, a second eight-factor
CFA was conducted on the threat items with the reverse-scored threat items excluded
from the analysis (see Table 4). This second eight-factor CFA resulted in a good fit (CFI
= 0.97, TLI = 0.97, SRMR = 0.03, RMSEA = 0.05 [0.04, 0.06]) and was used to create
the final threat scales. Appropriate threat items were averaged together to create each
subscale. Generally, the final threat subscales maintained good internal reliability (see
Table 5), except for the two-item existential threat scale (α = .60, ω = .60). The two-item
existential threat scale was retained, despite this poor internal reliability, because of its
excellent face validity.
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Table 4
Eight-Factor CFA on Threat Items, Excluding Reverse-Scored Items

Table 5
Threat Subscale Internal Reliabilities
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White Nationalism Scale Construction. A one-factor CFA was conducted on
the five White nationalism items (see Appendix B, Table B3). CFA results indicated a
poor fit (CFI = 0.96, TLI = 0.92, SRMR = 0.04, RMSEA = 0.14 [0.10, 0.19]). However,
a follow-up EFA supported a one-factor solution (see Table 6); therefore, a one-factor
structure was retained. Items were averaged together to create the final White nationalism
scale (α = .87, ω = .87).
Table 6
Follow-Up Exploratory Factor Analysis on all White Nationalism Items

Outgroup Restricting Policy Scale Construction. A two-factor CFA was
conducted on the 12 policy items, designating an immigration policy factor and a racial
policy factor (see Appendix B, Table B4). Results indicated a poor fit (CFI = 0.84, TLI =
0.80, SRMR = 0.07, RMSEA = 0.12 [0.11, 0.14]); therefore, a follow-up EFA was
conducted. The EFA suggested a one-factor solution (see Appendix B, Table B5);
however, the model was still questionable due to an item that did not load onto the single
factor and some of the reverse-scored items having weak estimates. As in the
construction of the threat subscales, a secondary CFA was conducted with the reversescored items as well as the unloaded immigration policy item removed (see Table 7). The
one-factor CFA resulted in a good fit (CFI = 0.98, TLI = 0.97, SRMR = 0.03, RMSEA =
0.07 [0.03, 0.11]). When averaged together, the scale had good internal reliability (α =
.87, ω = .87).
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Table 7
One-Factor CFA on Policy Items, Excluding Reverse-Scored and Unloaded Items

Initial Analyses
Basic descriptive statistics for all threat measures, dependent variables, and
political orientation are presented in Table 8. In addition, Table 9 displays the bycondition descriptive statistics. On average, people did not endorse threat perception
items, nor the dependent variables. To understand how the measured variables related to
one another, bivariate correlations were calculated for all of the variables and displayed
in Table 10. Consistent with prior research, political orientation was positively correlated
to threat perception and the dependent variables. Furthermore, most subcategories of
threat were strongly correlated with one another, except for existential threat which was
moderately correlated with the other threat variables. Finally, as predicted, all threats
were positively related to the dependent variables.
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Table 8.
Descriptive Statistics for All Study 1 Variables

Note. The scales ranged from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree). For political
orientation, the scale ranged from -3 (extremely liberal) to +3 (extremely conservative).
Table 9.
Descriptive Statistics for All Study 1 Variables by Cultural Change Manipulation

Note. The scales ranged from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree). For political
orientation, the scale ranged from -3 (extremely liberal) to +3 (extremely conservative).
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Table 10.
Pairwise Bivariate Correlations for All Study 1 Variables
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Path Analysis
Two initial path analyses were conducted, with each path analysis testing one of
the two dependent variables. These path analyses used the demographic shift condition as
the indicator variable, coded so that the demographic shift manipulation was compared to
the mobility control condition. The indicator was allowed to have direct effects on all
subcategories of threat and one of the dependent variables (White nationalism beliefs in
Model 1 and the combined outgroup restricting policy measure in Model 2). The threat
mediators were allowed to have direct effects on the dependent variable within the model.
Both models controlled for political orientation. Direct effects were calculated for all
pathways and indirect effects were calculated for all significant pathways connecting the
indicator and the dependent variables (see Figures 2 and 3).
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Figure 2
Model 1 Testing Effects of Cultural Change Manipulation on Threat and White
Nationalism.
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Figure 3
Model 2 Testing Effects of Cultural Change Manipulation on Threat and Outgroup
Restricting Policies.
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Contrary to Hypothesis 1, the demographic change condition did not significantly
increase all threat perceptions, though all estimates were in the hypothesized direction.
Specifically, status, economic, existential, education, and prototypicality threat all
significantly increased in response to the cultural change manipulation; however, safety,
cultural, and morality threat perception did not significantly differ between conditions.
Within Models 1 and 2, not all subcategories of threat had significant relationships with
the dependent variables. In Model 1, status, safety, education, prototypicality, and
morality threat perception had significant positive direct pathways with White
nationalism beliefs. In Model 2, status, economic, safety, education, and cultural threat
perception all had significant positive direct pathways with outgroup restricting policies.
These results suggested that the different realistic and symbolic threats may elicit
different responses, whether it is through bolstering ingroup identity through White
nationalism beliefs or through outgroup restricting policy support.
Unfortunately, no significant indirect effects resulted from either model. This is
likely due to the path analyses removing the common variance between each subcategory
of threat--namely, removing the common variance of threat itself. Hayes (2013) states
that using parallel mediators that are too highly correlated to one another may create a
multicollinearity which affects the estimation of their partial relationships to the outcome
variable. Therefore, variance inflation factors (VIFs) were calculated to test for potential
multicollinearity. A VIF greater than five may indicate multicollinearity concerns,
especially within smaller sample sizes (Gareth et al., 2017; Johnston et al., 2018; Menard,
2001). Table 11 displays the VIFs for Models 1 and 2. Half of the VIFs in both models
exceeded the common threshold of five, suggesting that multicollinearity was a concern
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within both models. Consequently, the combined models likely obfuscated potential
important differences between the different types of threat; therefore, these results were
followed up with individual mediation analyses to determine the unique impact that the
cultural change manipulation had on the two dependent variables through various threat
perceptions.
Table 11
VIFs for Models 1 and 2

Follow-up Mediation Analyses
Focusing first the White nationalism measure, I examined eight different
mediation models each of which included the article manipulation as the indicator
variable, a different threat perception as mediator, and the White nationalism measure as
the dependent variable while controlling for political ideology. Results indicated that
safety threat (B = .09, SE = .10, p = .36), cultural threat (B = .17, SE = .10, p = .07), and
morality threat (B = .09, SE = .10, p = .37) all had nonsignificant indirect effects.
Conversely, status threat (B = .24, SE = .10, p = .02), economic threat (B = .22, SE = .09,
p = .01), existential threat (B = .16, SE = .06, p = .01), education threat (B = .17, SE = .08,

59
p = .03), and prototypicality threat (B = .22, SE = .10, p = .03) all had significant indirect
effects (see Appendix B, Table B6 for a complete table of mediation effects).
Turning towards the outgroup restricting policies measure, I examined eight
different mediation models each of which included the article manipulation as the
indicator variable, a different threat perception as mediator, and the outgroup restricting
policy measure as the dependent variable while controlling for political ideology. Similar
to White nationalism beliefs, results indicated that safety threat (B = .07, SE = .08, p =
.36), cultural threat (B = .14, SE = .08, p = .07), and morality threat (B = .07, SE = .08, p
= .37) all had nonsignificant indirect effects. However, results indicated that status threat
(B = .18, SE = .08, p = .02), economic threat (B = .20, SE = .08, p = .01), existential threat
(B = .11, SE = .05, p = .02), education threat (B = .17, SE = .08, p = .03), and
prototypicality threat (B = .16, SE = .08, p = .03) all had significant indirect effects (see
Appendix B, Table B7 for a complete table of mediation effects). These results suggested
that status, economic, existential, education, and prototypicality threats may be important
threat perceptions in the relationship between White participants’ reactions to cultural
changes occurring in the United States.
Discussion
The current study built upon previous research investigating White Americans’
responses to cultural changes occurring in the United States. Specifically, it investigated
how White Americans may perceive changing demographics as threatening their current
or future standing in the United States and how these threat perceptions may influence
their attitudes about ingroup and outgroup members. This study was one of the first to
examine such a broad range of threat perceptions in response to a cultural change
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manipulation. Furthermore, this study is the first to examine how these threat perceptions
may relate to support for White nationalism beliefs (as opposed to support for White
nationalist groups). Together, this study is an important step towards understanding what
may be contributing to the rise in White hate in the United States.
Results indicated that, in general, the cultural change manipulation did increase
perceptions of various types of threat; however, in only partial support of Hypothesis I,
the cultural change manipulation did not increase all threat perceptions. Turning towards
the research question, results indicated that threat perceptions did relate to support for
White nationalism beliefs and outgroup restricting policies. In fact, indirect effects of the
cultural change manipulation on the dependent variables showed the same five threat
perceptions as being significant mediators—status, economic, existential, education, and
prototypicality threat. These significant indirect effects may suggest that these five threat
perceptions play a key role in support for White nationalism beliefs and outgroup
restricting policies. These findings are consistent with some previous findings in the
literature. For instance, Craig and Richeson (2014a) found that the demographic shift
manipulation increased perceptions of status threat in White participants and increased
expressions of pro-White racial bias.
Although this study found evidence for changes in intergroup relations in
response to several threat perceptions, there were several limitations to the study. The
present study consisted of 50% conservatives. However, it may be beneficial to
oversample conservatives, rather than sample in a representative fashion, as I set out to
examine relatively extreme attitudinal changes, namely, support for White nationalism
beliefs. Because White nationalism beliefs are highly correlated with conservatism,
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oversampling conservatives may be a more effective way of utilizing my finite funding
resources opposed to sampling from populations negatively correlated with the outcome
variables (i.e., liberals). Another limitation was that Study 1 was underpowered. Due to
limited funding resources, I could not recruit enough participants to properly power the
complex path analyses. Because the study was underpowered, the results of the analyses
must be interpreted with care. Study 2b improves upon these limitations by oversampling
conservative, simplifying analyses, and recruiting enough participants to provide
sufficient power to detect main effects.
Study 2a
Study 1 aimed to establish the base relationships between cultural change, threat
perceptions, and support for White nationalism beliefs and outgroup restricting policies.
Although the results of Study 1 provided tentative evidence for which threat perceptions
may play an important role in mediating cultural change and intergroup relations, the
study measured rather than manipulated the threat mediators. Therefore, Studies 2a and
2b aimed to extend Study 1 by manipulating the threat perceptions involved in
demographic changes. To do this, Study 2a served as a pilot study to establish how to
effectively manipulate the threat perceptions shown to be more critical in Study 1. Study
2b then utilized these threat manipulations to determine whether there was a causal
relationship between certain threat perceptions and the dependent variables of interest.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis II
I predicted that participants in a given threat condition would report greater threat
corresponding to their condition compared to the other threat conditions.
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Hypothesis III
I predicted that participants in the assuaged threat condition would perceive
significantly less threat than participants in all other threat conditions.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through Prolific. I requested a Prolific sample of selfidentified White United States residents. An a priori power analysis was conducted using
GPower 3.1.9.2 for an ANOVA specifying six groups, an effect size of f = .20, an alpha =
.05, and power = .80. The power analysis suggested a sample size of 330 participants to
sufficiently power main effects. I recruited 340 participants to account for potential
noncompliance. Since the original education manipulation was unsuccessful (see
Appendix C for original education manipulation results), an extra 50 participants were
recruited to test an altered education manipulation. These samples were recruited from
the same source, using the same procedure, with relatively little time elapsing between
recruitment phases (less than a month). Because of this, there was no reason to expect
that these samples would systematically vary and therefore, both samples were combined.
The final sample consisted of 379 participants after data cleaning procedures (aged 18 –
79, M = 40.6, SD = 14.2; political ideology M = -0.89, SD = 1.77; 46.7% female, 50.9%
male, 2.3% other; income M = $69,400, SD = $42,900; 13.0% with a high school degree
or less, 32.8% with some college or a 2-year degree, 38.4% with a bachelor’s degree, and
15.8% with a graduate degree). Participants were paid $0.60 for 5 minutes of
participation in the pilot study.
Procedure
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Prolific participants that met requirements (e.g., White, United States residents)
viewed the study posting online. If they were interested in participating in the study, they
could click into the Qualtrics survey and read the information sheet; the information sheet
stated that participants would read and answer questions about a recent news article. The
information sheet also detailed the participants’ time commitment, compensation,
anonymity, and potential risks and benefits of participating in the research. They either
clicked that they agreed to participate in the survey, or they were redirected back to
Prolific’s website.
Participants who agreed to participate in the survey filled out a short
demographics section (age, sex, race, income, education, and political identification) to
ease them into participation. Next, participants were asked to read a recently published
news article and answer questions afterwards about the article. This article was an
adapted version of the demographic change article used in Study 1 and tested the various
threat manipulations (described below). Participants were randomly assigned to read one
of six articles manipulating threat perception. The “Next” button was programmed to
display after one minute on the article page so that participants could not immediately
skip past the manipulation. After reading the article, participants answered questions
about the potential threat described in the article. Finally, participants read the debriefing
sheet and were compensated for their participation (see Appendix G for complete
survey).
Measures
Threat Perception Manipulation. Threat perception was manipulated using
adapted versions of the cultural change manipulation from Study 1. These threat
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manipulations were based on the findings from Study 1, namely, several different cultural
change articles were created to manipulate status, economic, existential, education, and
prototypicality threat as these five threats were shown to partially mediate the
relationship between cultural change and endorsement of White nationalism beliefs and
support for outgroup restricting policies. Since Study 1 demonstrated that the base
demographic change manipulation was threatening to participants (it significantly
increased threat perception of status, economic, existential, education, and prototypicality
threats compared to the control condition), I also included an assuaged threat condition in
which participants were specifically told that there was no threat present (similar to the
assuaged threat condition utilized in Craig & Richeson, 2014b). The assuaged threat
condition was included to more accurately gauge participants’ nonthreatened baseline.
All articles were identical to the cultural change manipulation used in Study 1
besides the addition of a paragraph at the end of the article which specified the threat
manipulation and two bullet points in the beginning of the article highlighting key points.
The threat conditions were intended to prime White participants with the specified threat
discussed within the threat passages (see Table 12 for an overview of how the threat
manipulation passages differed by condition). In addition to the threat manipulation
passages, two bullet points were added to the beginning of each article. These bullet
points were intended to simulate recent trends in online news articles in which journalists
highlight key takeaway points from their articles. The first of these bullet points always
highlighted the demographic shift, stating: “By 2042, Americans who identify themselves
as Hispanic, Black, Asian, American Indian, Native Hawaiian, or Pacific Islander will
together outnumber non-Hispanic Whites”. The second bullet point highlighted a key
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sentence from the threat manipulation paragraph, in an attempt to make the threat
manipulation more salient. See Appendix D for the complete articles, including the
original education threat manipulation; the new education threat manipulation differed
from the original manipulation only in its addition of the word “elite” before colleges and
universities.
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Table 12
Study 2a Threat Manipulation Passages
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Threat Items. Participants answered five questions regarding the threats
potentially present within the article they were assigned. Before answering the items,
participants were informed to “Please answer the following questions based on the article
you just read”. Participants were asked “To what extent did the article suggest that
minorities threaten…”: “White Americans’ status in the United States”; “White
Americans’ economic prosperity”; “White Americans’ existence as a racial category”;
“White Americans’ access to top quality education”; and “White Americans being seen
as the typical American”. All items were rated on a 5-point scale (0, not at all; 3,
somewhat; 5, extremely) and were presented in a random order.
Results
Data Cleaning
Each participant response was checked for ineligibility and noncompliance. No
participants were ineligible—all met the eligibility criteria. No participants failed the
manipulation check. The average completion time was 241.16 seconds (around 4
minutes), participants who exceeded a completion time of 615.96 seconds (10 minutes,
27 seconds; two standard deviations above the average) were removed from the analysis
(N = 12). After removing these participants, the final sample size was 379.
Data missingness did not exceed 10% (missingness was 0.23%). Therefore,
missing data was imputed using mean imputation.
ANOVAs
Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each threat manipulation
condition with the five threat assessment questions serving as repeated measures factors.
To minimize the examined contrasts, these analyses focused only on the contrasts as they
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related to the specific threat being manipulated. In other words, contrasts were only
examined for the target threat as it related to each other threat; difference between nontarget threats and each other threat were not examined since they had no bearing on
whether the manipulation was successful. I used Bonferroni’s post-hoc test correction as I
specified a set of planned comparisons.
Contrary to Hypothesis II, prototypicality threat appeared to play a leading role in
all threat manipulation conditions. Specifically, prototypicality threat was consistently
one of the highest rated threats within all six conditions. Furthermore, prototypicality
threat was not significantly different from the target threats in the status, economic, and
education conditions, and was rated significantly higher than all other threats in the
assuaged threat condition (see Figures 4 – 9). This consistent appearance across
conditions could suggest that prototypicality threat was triggered from the base assertions
within the demographic change article. Due to the consistency of prototypicality threat
across all conditions, I continued to examine the other contrasts within conditions as
prototypicality threat did not appear to have an undue effect on a single condition.
Turning first to the status threat condition, the repeated measures ANOVA
indicated a significant difference in threat assessments, F(4, 216) = 18.50, p < .001, η2 =
.13. A post-hoc Bonferroni test showed that participants in the status threat condition
rated the status threat item (M = 2.67, SD = 1.47) significantly higher than the economic
(M = 2.07, SD = 1.29), existential (M = 1.97, SD = 1.30), and education threat (M = 1.53,
SD = 1.09; see Figure 4) items. These results suggested that the status threat manipulation
successfully manipulated the perception of status threat.
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Figure 4
Status Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***; error bars display 95% CI
In the economic threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat assessments, F(4, 220) = 18.30, p < .001, η2 = .12. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that participants in the economic threat condition rated the
economic threat item (M = 3.04, SD = 1.37) significantly higher than the existential (M =
2.16, SD = 1.28) and education threat (M = 1.82, SD = 1.15; see Figure 5) items. Notably,
the economic threat item did not significantly differ from status threat (M = 2.82, SD =
1.38) item, though this may be explained by the conceptual interconnections between
economics and status (to be discussed in the discussion section). Results suggested that
the economic threat manipulation was relatively successful at manipulating the
perception of economic threat.
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Figure 5
Economic Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***; error bars display 95% CI
In the existential threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat assessments, F(4, 212) = 34.50, p < .001, η2 = .26. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that participants in the existential threat condition rated the
existential threat item (M = 3.28, SD = 1.63) significantly higher than the status (M =
2.43, SD = 1.55), economic (M = 1.48, SD = .97), and education threat (M = 1.40, SD =
.90; see Figure 6) items. These results suggested that the existential threat manipulation
successfully manipulated the perception of existential threat.
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Figure 6
Existential Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***; error bars display 95% CI
In the education threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat assessments, F(4, 192) = 9.63, p < .001, η2 = .09. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that participants in the education threat condition rated the
education threat item (M = 2.04, SD = 1.12) significantly lower than the prototypicality
threat item (M = 2.65, SD = 1.33; see Figure 7), no other threats significantly differed
from education threat. These results suggested that the education threat manipulation did
not successfully manipulate education threat.
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Figure 7
Education Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***; error bars display 95% CI
In the prototypicality threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat assessments, F(4, 220) = 37.10, p < .001, η2 = .25. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that participants in the prototypicality threat condition rated
the prototypicality threat item (M = 3.27, SD = 1.36) significantly higher than the status
(M = 2.21, SD = 1.37), economic (M = 1.54, SD = 1.04), existential threat (M = 1.87, SD
= 1.18), and education threat (M = 1.35, SD = .88; see Figure 8) items. These results
suggested that the prototypicality threat manipulation successfully manipulated the
perception of prototypicality threat.
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Figure 8
Prototypicality Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***; error bars display 95% CI
In the assuaged threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat assessments, F(4, 212) = 27.10, p < .001, η2 = .17. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that participants in the assuaged threat condition rated the
prototypicality threat item (M = 2.65, SD = 1.26) significantly higher than the status (M =
1.69, SD = 1.13), economic (M = 1.37, SD = .90), existential (M = 1.74, SD = 1.15), and
education threat (M = 1.35, SD = .87; see Figure 9) items.
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Figure 9
Assuaged Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***
Since these results casted some doubt as to whether the assuaged threat condition
was reducing threat perception, I ran a follow-up independent samples t-test comparing
the threat ratings of participants in the assuaged threat condition to participants in all
other conditions. Results from the independent samples t-test demonstrated that the
assuaged threat condition significantly reduced ratings of all five threats (see Table 13),
confirming Hypothesis III. In context with the threat assessment item anchors, the means
of the threat conditions (status, economic, existential, education, and prototypicality) fell
closer to 2 (the article somewhat threatened) and 3 (the article moderately threatened) on
the scale; while the means of the assuaged condition dropped closer to 1 (the article
slightly threatened) and 2 (the article somewhat threatened).
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Table 13
Study 2a Follow-up Independent Samples t-Test Comparing Participants in Assuaged
Threat Condition to Participants in All Other Conditions Using Welch’s t.

Discussion
This study built upon the previous study by taking potentially important threat
perceptions for influencing White Americans’ reactions to cultural change and using
them to create new experimental materials. This study was unique in that it aimed to
manipulate threat perceptions rather than measuring them. As previously mentioned,
there is a notable lack of experimental studies manipulating threat in the intergroup threat
and cultural change literatures, especially the manipulation of both realistic and symbolic
threat perceptions (Craig & Richeson, 2014b; Reik et al., 2006; Rios et al., 2018).
Therefore, this study was an important step towards validating new methods to
manipulate threat and test its effects.
Generally, the threat manipulations successfully manipulated the threats they
aimed to manipulate. Specifically, status, economic, existential, and prototypicality threat
conditions all appeared to function in ways appropriate for their condition, partially
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supporting Hypothesis II. Interestingly, there were asymmetric results between status and
economic threat items found in the status and economic threat conditions—such that the
status threat item was rated significantly higher than the economic threat item within the
status threat condition (as hypothesized in Hypothesis II), but status threat and economic
threat did not significantly differ within the economic threat condition (counter to
Hypothesis II). This may have occurred due to societal representations of status. For
instance, accumulation of wealth through economic opportunities tends to signal social
status (Bourdieu, 1984; Mandel et al., 2006); however, social status can often be gained
through more than just economic prosperity, such as through outstanding moral character
or knowledge (Hyman, 1942). Therefore, I proceeded to use the status and economic
threat manipulations even though results of the economic threat condition did not confirm
hypotheses.
Contrary to Hypotheses II and III, neither form of the education threat
manipulation successfully manipulated education threat. Furthermore, although education
is often thought to be a critical aspect of status (Hollingshead, 1975), results
demonstrated that status threat assessment did not significantly differ from education
threat assessment in the education condition. This would suggest that the education threat
condition was not activating potentially related measured constructs either. Even though
the education threat manipulation was not effective, it was still used as one of the
conditions in Study 2b to determine whether these null results would replicate.
One of the most surprising findings of Study 2a was prototypicality’s strong
presence within all manipulations. Prototypicality’s presence within all conditions would
suggest that its effects were driven by the base article itself—the demographic changes
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occurring in the United States. These findings were surprising since prototypicality threat
is not often examined in the cultural change literature (Danbold & Huo, 2015; Meeussen
et al., 2013), although the literature which does examine prototypicality has found that it
is a unique predictor of numerous negative intergroup attitudes and policies (as discussed
on page 29 of the introduction). These results may suggest that prototypicality plays a
more central role in threat responses to cultural change than previously thought and
should be examined more closely within future research.
Finally, although prototypicality threat assessment was still high in the assuaged
threat condition, the follow-up t-test suggested that this assessment was significantly
reduced within the assuaged threat condition. In fact, the t-test determined that all threat
assessments were significantly reduced within the assuaged threat condition, confirming
Hypothesis III. These results suggest that simply telling someone that, in light of changes
occurring around them, their lived experience will likely not change may be a simple and
effective way of allaying their potential threat responses.
Study 2b
Using the materials developed and tested in Study 2a, Study 2b manipulated
threat perception in the wake of demographic changes to determine its causal impact on
support for White nationalism beliefs and outgroup restricting policies. Given the current
uncertainty within the intergroup threat theory and cultural change literatures regarding
threat perceptions’ impact on intergroup relations, it is important to test these causal
relationships while examining multiple different kinds of threat perceptions. Due to the
conflicting literature, this study tested two competing hypotheses around threat
perceptions’ impact on intergroup relations—a prediction that all five threat
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manipulations would increase endorsement of both dependent variables and the
prediction that threat manipulations would have a different impact on the two dependent
variables.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis IV
Based on the consistency of the indirect effects found in Study 1 for both
dependent variables, the first competing hypothesis was that participants would more
highly endorse White nationalism beliefs and outgroup restricting policies in the five
threat conditions compared to the assuaged threat condition.
Hypothesis V
Based on direct effects in Study 1 and on White nationalism literature, the second
competing hypothesis was that there would be differential endorsement of both
dependent measures based on the threat condition:
a. Participants would endorse White nationalism beliefs significantly more when
within the status, existential, and prototypicality threat conditions compared to the
economic and education threat conditions. White nationalism is strongly rooted in beliefs
that Whites are superior and more deserving than other races (Brown, 2009), should have
their own special ethnostate (Re-Branding White Supremacy, 2016), and that Whites are
in danger of no longer existing (Anti-Defamation League, n.d.). These key beliefs are
more closely aligned with status, existential, and prototypicality threats. Furthermore,
there is also evidence that although White supremacists leverage job and education
competition to attract supporters, it is not critical to their core beliefs or rhetoric (Blessing
& Roberts, 2018).
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b. Participants would endorse outgroup restricting policies significantly more
when in the economic and education threat conditions compared to the status, existential,
and prototypicality threat conditions. Restriction of others’ freedoms may be closely tied
to insecurities around the ingroups’ ability to compete for and acquire access to scarce
resources (Landmann et al., 2019; Renfro et al., 2006), closely aligning to restriction of
the outgroup through policy changes.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited through Prolific. I requested a Prolific sample of selfidentified White United States residents. I recruited a sample of 70% conservative
participants. A power analysis using GPower 3.1.9.2 determined that an adequate sample
size to detect main effects for this experiment would be 327 participants. This was based
on a one-way ANCOVA specifying six groups, one covariate, an effect size of f = .20, an
alpha = .05, and a power = .80. Based on these estimates, I collected 400 participants to
account for potential participant removal. After data cleaning, the final sample consisted
of 372 participants (age M = 42.80, SD = 15.40; political ideology M = 0.90, SD = 1.87;
47.8% female, 50.0% male, 2.1% nonbinary; income M = $74,200, SD = $43,900; 11.9%
with a high school degree or less, 33.7% with some college or a 2-year degree, 35.8%
with a bachelor’s degree, and 18.6% with a graduate degree). Participants were paid
$1.70 for their successful completion of the 10-minute survey.
Procedure
Prolific participants that met requirements (e.g., White, U.S. residents) viewed the
study posting online. If they were interested in participating in the study, they clicked into
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the Qualtrics survey and read the information sheet. The information sheet explained that
participants would provide their opinions of a recent news article and their general
attitudes and opinions of recent political and social issues. The information sheet also
detailed the participants’ time commitment, compensation, anonymity, and potential risks
and benefits of participating in the research. They either clicked that they agreed to
participate in the survey, or they were redirected back to Prolific’s website.
Participants who agreed to participate in the survey began by filling out a short
demographics section (age, sex, race, income, education, and political identification).
Next, participants were randomly assigned to read one of six news articles (from Study
2a) and answered questions about the article. These articles served as the study’s threat
manipulation, indicating demographic changes threaten status, economic opportunities,
existential existence, education opportunities, prototypicality, or serve as no threat at all
to the White population. The “Next” button was programmed to display after one minute
on the article page so that participants could not immediately skip past the manipulation.
Participants then answered a manipulation check question and two other questions about
their interest in the article and their trust in the author. As in Study 1, participants were
told they would then answer questions about their opinions and attitudes towards recent
political and social issues in the United States. These questions included the five threat
measures pertinent to the manipulations, the White nationalism measure, and the
outgroup restricting policy measures used in Study 1. The threat measures were presented
first and then the White nationalism and policy measures were presented in random order.
All measures were presented in their entirety, including both positively and negatively
worded items, to provide a more balanced experience for the participants. Finally,
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participants read the debriefing sheet which informed them of the purpose of the study
and were compensated for their participation (see Appendix F for the complete survey).
Measures
Threat Perception Manipulation. The threat perception manipulations
developed in Study 2a were used in Study 2b. This threat perception manipulation
involved six conditions: status, economic, existential, education, prototypicality, and
assuaged threat. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of the six articles.
Manipulation Check and Cover Story Items. Participants were asked several
questions to confirm the cover story of evaluating the article they read and to serve as a
manipulation check. The first item was, “Which of the following statements best
describes the topic of the article you just read?”. Other items included, “How interesting
was the article you read?” and “How much do you trust the author of the article?”. Both
items were measured on a 7-point scale (0, Not at all – 6, Very much).
Threat Perception. The threat perception measures assessed participants’
perceptions of the five threats deemed important in Study 1: status, economic, existential,
education, and prototypicality. These threat measures included all threat items used in
Study 1 for these subcategories of threat. All threat items were included to present a more
balanced experience for participants; however, items were scaled in the same way as in
Study 1 to maintain consistency between studies (scale reliability was checked). All items
were be rated on a 7-point scale (-3, strongly disagree – +3, strongly agree). For an
overview of all threat subscales and items see Table 14.
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Table 14
Complete List of Threat Items in Study 2b

Note: * indicates a reverse-scored item.
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White Nationalism. Support for White nationalism beliefs was measured using
the same 5-item measure used in Study 1. Items included: “Multiculturalism is the
biggest threat to White America”; “I am sympathetic to organizations/groups that bring
attention to White concerns”; “White American culture is what makes this country great”;
“One of the problems with America is the decline of Whiteness”; and “In order to
maintain White status, it is sometimes necessary to use violence towards racial/ethnic
minority groups”. All items were rated on a 7-point scale (-3, strongly disagree – +3,
strongly agree).
Outgroup Restricting Policies. Support for outgroup restricting policies was
measured using the same policy items used in Study 1. All policy items were included to
present a more balanced experience for participants; however, items were scaled in the
same way as in Study 1 to maintain consistency between studies (scale reliability was
checked). All items were rated on a 7-point scale (-3, strongly disagree – +3, strongly
agree). For an overview of the outgroup restricting policy items see Table 15.
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Table 15
Complete List of Outgroup Restricting Policy Items in Study 2b

Note: * indicates a reverse-scored item.
Attention Check. There was one attention check item included in the survey.
This item appeared amongst the final few threat perception items. The attention check
item stated, “In America, please select ‘Somewhat agree’ if you are paying attention”.
Participants needed to select the requested response to be considered “attentive”.
Results
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Data Cleaning
Each participant response was checked for ineligibility and noncompliance.
Participants who identified as nonwhite or multiracial were removed from analysis (N =
8). Participants who failed the attention check (N = 2) or who incorrectly identified the
article they read via the manipulation check (N = 1) were removed from the analysis.
Finally, the average completion time was 545.86 seconds (around 9 minutes), participants
who exceeded a completion time of 1,238.70 seconds (around 20 minutes or two standard
deviations above the average) were removed from the analysis (N = 17). After removing
these participants, the final sample size was 372.
Data missingness did not exceed 10% (missingness was 0.32%). Therefore,
missing data was imputed using mean imputation.
Data Reduction Procedures
Scales were constructed based on the CFA and EFA results from Study 1. All
appropriate items were averaged together to create the scales. Scale reliability was tested
for each scale. If the scale reliabilities were poor, follow-up factor analysis would have
been conducted to determine an appropriate factor structure.
Threat items were averaged together in accordance with the final scales created in
Study 1 (see Table 16 for complete list of items included in each threat scale). Each threat
scale maintained good internal reliability (see Table 17). Next, all five White nationalism
items were averaged together. The scale resulted in good internal reliability (α = .88, ω =
.89). Finally, the outgroup restricting policy items were averaged together based on the
final scale created in Study 1 (see Table 18 for a complete list of items included in the
scale). The scale resulted in good internal reliability (α = .88, ω = .88).
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Table 16
Threat Items Included in Each Threat Scale in Study 2b

Table 17
Threat Subscale Internal Reliabilities for Study 2b
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Table 18
Outgroup Restricting Policy Items Included in the Scale for Study 2b

Initial Analyses
Basic descriptive statistics for all threat measures and dependent variables are
presented in Table 19. On average, participants did not endorse the threat perception
measures, with no average crossing the midpoint of the scale. Likewise, on average,
participants did not endorse the White nationalism belief scale, nor did they strongly
endorse the outgroup restricting policy scale, with the average just crossing the scale’s
midpoint.
Bivariate correlations for all variables are displayed in Table 20. Consistent with
Study 1, political orientation was positively correlated to threat perceptions and the
dependent variables. Also consistent with Study 1, all subcategories of threat were
strongly correlated with one another, besides existential threat which was moderately
correlated with all other threats. Finally, all threat perceptions were positively correlated
with the two dependent variables.
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Table 19
Descriptive Statistics for Study 2b

Table 20
Pairwise Bivariate Correlations for All Variables in Study 2b

ANCOVAs
Two ANCOVAs were conducted to test competing Hypotheses IV and V. The
article conditions served as the grouping variable, the White nationalism measure and
outgroup restricting policies measure served as the two different dependent variables, and
both analyses controlled for political ideology. I utilized Tukey’s post hoc test correction
as I was interested in comparing effects across all conditions.
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Contrary to either competing hypothesis, neither the White nationalism ANCOVA
(F(5, 365) = 0.56, p = .73, η2 = .005) nor the outgroup restricting policy ANCOVA (F(5,
365) = 1.07, p = .38, η2 = .007) indicated significant differences between conditions (see
Figures 10 and 11). In fact, follow-up Bayesian analysis of the ANCOVAs (using default
priors specified by jamovi; Morey & Rouder, 2018; Rouder et al., 2012) found a BF01 of
265.66 and 152.93 for the White nationalism and outgroup restricting policy ANCOVAs,
respectively. Based on traditional cut-offs for Bayesian analysis5, these results would
suggest decisive support for the null hypothesis (no effect of the threat manipulation) for
both analyses. Detailed results of the Bayesian analyses can be found in Appendix E.
Figure 10
ANCOVA with Threat Condition Predicting White Nationalism Beliefs

5

BF 1–3: anecdotal support for the model; BF 3–10: substantial support for the model; BF
10–30: strong support for the model; BF 30–100: very strong support for the model; and BF
>100: decisive support for the model (Jeffreys, 1961).
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Figure 11
ANCOVA with Threat Condition Predicting Outgroup Restricting Policy Support

Exploratory Analyses
Follow-Up ANCOVAs. Due to the null findings, I explored whether participants’
trust in the author of the article had an impact of the ANCOVA analyses. It may have
been the case that some participants in Study 2b did not believe or were skeptical of the
content of the article, therefore they may not have been threatened by it. I added the trust
item (“How much do you trust the author of the article?”) as an additional covariate in the
ANCOVA analyses. Results demonstrated that trust in the author of the article was not a
significant covariate in the White nationalism ANCOVA (F(1, 364) = .41, p = .52, η2 =
.001). Results further demonstrated that although the trust item was a significant
covariate in the outgroup restricting policies ANCOVA (F(1, 364) = 8.82, p = .003, η2 =
.01), the article condition remained nonsignificant (F(5, 364) = 1.13, p = .34, η2 = .007).
Exploratory Repeated Measures ANOVAs. Finally, I explored whether
participants responded to the article manipulations in ways we would have expected
based on the pilot test findings. To do this, I conducted repeated measures ANOVAs for
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each threat manipulation condition with the threat measures as the repeated factor. As in
Study 2a, contrasts were only examined for the target threat as it related to each other
threat.
In the status threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a significant
difference in threat perceptions, F(4, 236) = 11.30, p < .001, η2 = .03. A post-hoc
Bonferroni test showed that participants in the status threat condition rated status threat
(M = -.54, SD = 1.59) significantly higher than existential threat (M = -1.26, SD = 1.71)
and prototypicality threat (M = -.98, SD = 1.73; see Figure 12). These results differed
from the pattern of results in Study 2a. Notably, in this study, status threat was more
strongly endorsed than prototypicality threat and did not significantly differ from ratings
of economic or education threat.
Figure 12
Status Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***; error bars display 95% CI
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In the economic threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat perceptions, F(4, 248) = 16.30, p < .001, η2 = .05. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that participants in the economic threat condition rated
economic threat (M = -.46, SD = 1.85) significantly higher than existential threat (M = 1.46, SD = 1.51; see Figure 13). Unlike in Study 2a, in this study, economic threat did not
significantly differ from education threat, only from existential threat.
Figure 13
Economic Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***; error bars display 95% CI
In the existential threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat perceptions, F(4, 244) = 3.89, p = .004, η2 = .02. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that although there was significant differences between threat
perceptions, none of those differences related to existential threat (see Figure 14). Unlike
in Study 2a, existential threat did not significantly differ from any other threat perception.
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Figure 14
Existential Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

In the education threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat perceptions, F(4, 256) = 5.91, p < .001, η2 = .03. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that participants in the education threat condition rated
education threat (M = -.44, SD = 1.83) significantly higher than existential threat (M = 1.22, SD = 1.71) and prototypicality threat (M = -1.13, SD = 1.60; see Figure 15). Unlike
in Study 2a, in this study, education threat was rated significantly higher than
prototypicality threat (rather than lower) and existential threat (rather than no difference).
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Figure 15
Education Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***; error bars display 95% CI
In the prototypicality threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat perceptions, F(4, 232) = 4.17, p = .003, η2 = .02. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that although there were significant differences between
threat perceptions, none of those differences related to prototypicality threat (see Figure
16). In stark contrast to Study 2a, prototypicality threat demonstrated no significant
differences from any other threat perceptions.
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Figure 16
Prototypicality Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

In the assuaged threat condition, repeated measures ANOVA indicated a
significant difference in threat perceptions, F(4, 240) = 4.74, p = .001, η2 = .02. A posthoc Bonferroni test showed that participants in the assuaged threat condition rated
education threat (M = -.59, SD = 1.67) significantly higher than existential threat (M = 1.11, SD = 1.66) and prototypicality threat (M = -1.14, SD = 1.60; see Figure 17). Unlike
in Study 2a, in this study, prototypicality threat was not rated significantly higher than all
other threats, rather, it was rated significantly lower than education threat.
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Figure 17
Assuaged Threat Manipulation Repeated Measures ANOVA

Note. p < .05*; p < .01**; p < .001***; error bars display 95% CI
Discussion
This study served as the culmination of the previous studies. It leveraged the
variable relationships found in Study 1 and utilized the tested manipulations from Study
2a to experimentally test threat perceptions’ causal impact on White nationalism beliefs
and support for outgroup restricting policies. Although Study 2b was carefully built upon
findings within the literature and from the previous two studies, in total, results suggested
that the threats manipulated within the article conditions had no effect on participants’
endorsement of White nationalism beliefs or in outgroup restricting policy support,
supporting neither Hypothesis IV nor Hypothesis V. These results did not change when
controlling for trust in the author of the articles. Furthermore, the assuaged threat
condition did not significantly lower endorsement of White nationalism beliefs or
outgroup restricting policies.
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Crucially, exploratory repeated measures ANOVAs suggested that the article
manipulations were not manipulating threat in the same way suggested by the pilot study.
First, the results showed divergent threat response patterns from the pilot study. Threats
were endorsed differently under certain threat manipulations than they were in the pilot
study. Furthermore, the results from the exploratory analyses showed that none of the
marginal means for any of the analyses passed the midpoint of the scale. This is
important to note because responses beneath the midpoint of the threat scale demonstrate
disagreement with the items—suggesting that participants did not perceive those threats.
Social identities, like political or racial identity, can guide and solidify how a person
perceives group threats and how they choose to respond to them (Ellemers et al., 2002;
Haslam et al., 2010; Hornung et al., 2019; Reicher et al., 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1986),
especially when the identity is salient (Unsworth & Fielding, 2014) or when the ingroup
is threatened (Wilson, 2001). Since the article manipulations did not threaten participants
in Study 2b, participants did not need to react in ways to protect their ingroup—like
increasing support for belief systems that bolster ingroup identity and status or policies
that protect their ingroup and restrict or harm the outgroup. Therefore, the null findings
for White nationalism and outgroup restricting policy support align with the exploratory
analyses finding that participants were not threatened by the articles they read.
These unexpected results could have been driven by the different ways of
assessing threat between the two studies. Whereas Study 2a directly asked participants to
assess the extent to which each threat was present in the article they read, Study 2b asked
participants to respond to entire threat scales. Considering the results of both Study 2a
and 2b, it may be fair to conclude that while participants could somewhat accurately
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identify various potential threats in the Study 2a articles, it does not necessarily mean that
those threats were internalized by the participants. Future studies should explore both
threat assessment and threat perception in response to these threat manipulations within a
single study. Examining both ways of assessing threat within a single study would be
able to determine if the divergent findings found within this analysis were due to
sampling differences or due to the manipulations not engaging threat perceptions.
Beyond difference in measurement of threat assessment or perceptions, it may
also be the case that the dependent variables were too extreme to be influenced by such a
mild manipulation. Though we have seen a steep rise in support for White nationalism
over the last decade, White nationalism remains a categorically extreme belief system
(Blee, 2008; Kruglanski et al., 2017). Because of this, it would be difficult for a single
article to exert much influence on these extreme beliefs. The null results found in this
study may actually provide some heartening evidence that articles, like the ones the threat
manipulations were based off, may not have a large effect on the general public (explored
at greater length in the General Discussion).
Finally, it may also be the case that these demographic changes may no longer be
surprising to participants who read about them. New and surprising events or information
capture attention (Kunda et al., 1990; Meyer et al., 1997) and can cause people to seek
out new information to understand the surprising occurrence (Maguire et al. 2011). When
these manipulations were first used in 2014, these population shifts were newly
announced in media. In other words, when these manipulations were first used, these
populations shifts were likely surprising to those reading about them. This surprise likely
caused participants to seek out information within the articles to understand it better,
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likely taking in more of the potentially threatening content. However, using these
manipulations eight years later may not have the same effect on participants as it did
before. Demographic changes occurring in the United States are not as surprising at they
were nearly a decade ago. Therefore, the low threat rating reported in Study 2b may be a
product of changing perceptions of demographic change in the United States.
General Discussion
This research sought to expand upon the current literature examining cultural
changes’ influence on White Americans’ perceptions of threat and their endorsement of
negative intergroup attitudes and beliefs such as support for White nationalism beliefs
and outgroup restricting policies. This research is critical as the United States has
experienced a consistent and considerable rise in White hate crimes and terrorism in the
past decade (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2021; Nakamura, 2021; Southern Poverty
Law Center, 2019; U.S. Department of Justice, 2020). Unfortunately, these terrorists have
often cited The Great Replacement Theory as a motivating factor for their crimes
(Beirich, 2019; Bowman et al., 2022). The Great Replacement conspiracy theory is
intimately connected to fears of real (and imagined) demographic changes occurring
around the world (Duke, 2012; Durso & Jacobs, 2013; Stormfront, 2013). Finding
reasons for why some White folk can see these demographic changes as harmless and
others can use it as a reason to commit murder and terrorism is of real significance to our
lives.
The literature has shown that demographic changes are often seen as a harbinger
of change—they can signal shifts in political power and changing cultural norms and
values (Cilluffo & Cohn, 2019; Cohn & Caumont, 2016; McVeigh & Estep, 2019).
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Previous literature has documented that majority groups, like Whites in the United States,
have a lot to lose during cultural shifts and therefore can be the most fervently against
these threats to their status quo (Durso & Jacobs, 2013; Gilliard-Matthews, 2011; Stephan
et al., 2015; Zárate et al., 2019). These threats can come in many different forms but are
often classified into two broad categories of realistic and symbolic threats (Stephan et al.,
2002, 2015). The previous threat literature has shown ample evidence that realistic and
symbolic threats are associated with many adverse intergroup outcomes, such as
prejudice and support for restrictive outgroup actions (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005;
Cohrs et al., 2005; Landmann et al., 2019; Pereira et al., 2010; Rios et al., 2018). Yet
little is known about which threat perceptions are more likely to lead to these adverse
outcomes, especially as it relates to the examination of a diverse array of threat
perceptions.
The current research sought to extend our understanding of cultural changes’
influence on perceptions of threat and threats’ influence on negative intergroup relations.
In an initial, mostly exploratory study, I sought to determine the causal influence cultural
change has on a variety of threat perceptions and how these threat perceptions related to
endorsement of White nationalism beliefs and outgroup restricting policies (Study 1). The
next study designed new manipulations which integrated threat perceptions into the
cultural change paradigm (Study 2a). Finally, these new manipulations were tested to
determine whether framing cultural changes within certain threat perceptions may be
more likely to cause endorsement of the negative intergroup beliefs (Study 2b). The
following section interprets and contextualizes the collective evidence for the hypotheses
and research questions driving this research.
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Evaluating the Hypotheses and Research Question
Hypothesis I
Hypothesis I predicted that the cultural change manipulation would increase threat
perceptions of all threat measures compared to the control condition (Study 1). There was
partial support found for Hypothesis I. Five of the eight subcategories of threat were
found to significantly increase in the demographic change condition compared to the
control condition. Though it is important to note that all paths leading to the other three
threats were in the hypothesized, positive direction. The five significant threat pathways
were consistent with previous literature which found that cultural change can increase
perceptions of threat (e.g., Major et al., 2018; Outten et al., 2018; Zárate et al., 2012).
Hypothesis II
Hypothesis II predicted that participants within a given threat condition would
report greater threat corresponding to their condition (Study 2a). Hypothesis II was
partially supported. Unfortunately, the education threat manipulation was unable to
appropriately manipulate perceptions of education threat. Furthermore, results for
existential, economic, and status threat conditions all indicated that prototypicality threat
was also present within the condition. These conditions were considered successful due
to the consistency by which prototypicality threat emerged within every condition; these
conditions were still able to appropriately manipulate their respective threat perceptions
in addition to the active prototypicality threat. In evaluating evidence from Study 2b,
however, it may be the case that these overlaps in prototypicality across conditions and
the close relationship between the threat perceptions within conditions may have
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contributed to the null findings in Study 2b. It is possible that the article conditions had
too much conceptual overlap or that the manipulations were too minor to offer a clean
and clearcut manipulation of threat.
Hypothesis III
Hypothesis III predicted that the assuaged threat condition would reduce threat
perceptions compared to all other threat conditions (Study 2a). Hypothesis III was
supported. Though prototypicality threat was still rated significantly higher than all other
threat perceptions in the assuaged threat condition, a follow-up t-test revealed that all
threat perceptions in the assuaged condition were rated significantly lower than in the
other threat conditions. This finding was consistent with pervious literature which found
that telling participants that their lived experience would remain consistent in the face of
cultural changes can allay their threat perception and concerns (Craig & Richeson,
2014b).
Hypothesis IV & V
Hypotheses IV and V posed competing hypotheses around threat perceptions’
impact on intergroup relations—that all threat manipulations would increase endorsement
of both dependent variables (Hypothesis IV) and that the threat manipulations would
have a different impact on the dependent variables (Hypothesis V; Study 2b). Neither
hypothesis was supported. Analyses found no differences between threat conditions in
predicting support for White nationalism beliefs or outgroup restricting policies. In
addition, these threat perceptions did not significantly differ from the assuaged threat
condition. Even when an additional covariate was included in the analyses (trust in the
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author of the article) results remained nonsignificant. Exploratory analyses revealed that
these null findings may have resulted because participants did not find these
manipulations particularly threatening.
Research Question I
Research Question I sought to understand how the various subcategories of threat
related to the endorsement of White nationalism beliefs and outgroup restricting policies
(Study 1). Correlational analyses from Study 1 and Study 2b showed that both dependent
variables had moderate to strong positive relationships with all threat perceptions
measured in the studies. Examining the results displayed in Figures 2 and 3 from Study 1
revealed that the various threat perceptions had different direct relationships with the two
dependent variables. Status, safety, education, prototypicality, and morality threat all
showed significant positive relationships with White nationalism beliefs, whereas, status,
economic, safety, education, and cultural threat all showed significant positive
relationships with outgroup restricting policies. Together these results found that the
various threat perceptions and the dependent variables shared positive relationships with
one another—endorsement of White nationalism beliefs and outgroup restricting policy
support was positively related to perceptions of threat. Unfortunately, these studies were
unable to provide consistent support for whether certain threat perceptions were more
related to certain outcomes or whether there was a causal link between threat perceptions
and the two dependent variables. Therefore, more research is needed to fully understand
how different threat perceptions relate to these two variables.
Evaluation and Implications of the Model
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The current series of studies focused on examining the proposed causal chain
between cultural change (through demographic changes), perceived threat, and intergroup
relations. Evaluation of the evidence for the model relies heavily on what researchers
would consider positive support for the theory. In other words, is causing an attitudinal
position to shift from strong disagreement to less strong disagreement considered
evidence for demographic change causing threat perception? Shifts to less disagreement
with extreme ideological positions may signal the beginning stages of radicalization
(discussed more below). Or is the evidence rooted in the shift from disagreement with a
position to agreement with a position? The shift to agreement with extreme ideological
positions may signal a later stage of radicalization. Currently, the literature has
considered the former to be evidence in support of the model.
Abiding by this current assessment of support for the model, Study 1 did provide
support for the first causal chain in the model—that cultural change (minority groups
growing in size) causes increases in threat perception. Study 1 found that the cultural
change article caused some threat perceptions to positively shift compared to the control
condition. However, Study 2b did not provide evidence in support of the causal chain
between perceived threat and intergroup relations (in these analyses, White nationalism
beliefs and outgroup restricting policy support). Although patterns were inconsistent
between Study 2a and 2b, the various article conditions did find unique patterns in threat.
For instance, patterns of threat assessment and perceptions in the existential threat
condition looked different from the patterns found in the status threat condition. This
would suggest that people were viewing and responding to threat conditions in different
ways. So, although Study 2b found null and inconclusive results, I contend that there are
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likely critical differences between these various subcategories of threat that could
influence how people respond to them. The key will be to develop manipulations that are
able to engage threat perceptions so that we can more accurately assess the causal
relationship between threat perception and potential downstream consequences.
Despite the current literature assessing any shift in threat response and resulting
attitudes as support for the model, I argue that it is critical for researchers to assess the
shifts that break the wall between disagreement and agreement with the perception or
sentiment being measured. For instance, the attitudinal shift between strongly disagreeing
with the government using the military to control lawful protests and slightly disagreeing
with that statement is meaningful and may compound over time if the person encounters
more sentiments that continue to move their position. However, the shift between
disagreeing with the sentiment that it is sometimes necessary to use violence towards
minority groups to maintain White status, to actively agreeing with that sentiment is key
in understanding what causes changes to intergroup relations, especially as it relates to
the process of radicalizing into extremist groups like White nationalists.
The null findings in Study 2b could suggest something quite heartening—that
news articles reporting on cultural changes may not be enough, on their own, to greatly
influence the general public. Rather, influencing public perceptions on White nationalism
belief systems, specifically, may involve the more targeted rhetoric and propaganda used
by far-right groups to truly sway endorsement for this extremity. Wiktorowicz (2004)
proposed a process by which people radicalize into Islamic extremism (though I believe
that this applies to most radicalization into extremist groups). This process begins with a
“cognitive opening” or a stressor that makes a person question their current position or
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worldview. Next comes a seeking stage by which a person searches for a new worldview
to make sense of what previously destabilized them. Finally, the person socializes these
beliefs and finds others with which to share their newfound ideology. Often, White
nationalists will target vulnerable people, who they deem as more easily persuadable,
with their rhetoric (Anglin, 2016; D’Anastasio, 2021; Robinson & Whittaker, 2020).
Therefore, threat manipulations, like the ones used in this dissertation, may be most
successful at influencing White nationalism beliefs when people are undergoing the
seeking and socialization phases of radicalization; when they are searching for
information to affirm their new fledgling worldview. In other words, there needs to be an
established wrong or cognitive opening for someone to be further persuaded into an
extreme belief system like White nationalism. Without this background providing an
entry way for radicalization, people are likely able to dismiss the information displayed
within the manipulation as not confirming their already held notions of the world
(confirmation bias; Klayman, 1995). If researchers want to fully understand the processes
people undergo when discovering White nationalism ideologies, we need to capture the
phase in which this threatening rhetoric becomes particularly influential.
Limitations and Next Steps
The current studies had several limitations that should be addressed in future
research. Nonetheless, the current studies built additional foundations on which future
research can expand and grow our knowledge on these important issues. To begin, due to
funding constraints Study 1 was underpowered to detect main effects and Studies 2a and
2b were sufficiently powered to detect main effects only. Therefore, although these
studies can provide some initial evidence for certain relationships between the variables,
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these studies cannot provide any definitive answers to the hypotheses. These studies
would benefit from future examination with appropriately powered analyses.
The current studies were also limited by the demographic change paradigm and
the dependent variables chosen in response to the paradigm. I believe that the
demographic change paradigm can be an effective way of manipulating perceptions of
cultural change; however, this paradigm is subtle and may be more appropriate for testing
more subtle attitudinal changes rather than the more extreme dependent variables tested
within this dissertation. This is especially true given the Prolific samples used in these
analyses. Although Prolific currently provides higher quality data and less biased
responding than MTurk samples (Eyal et al., 2021), it is still a convenience sample and
does not fully represent the general public nor the extremist segments of the population
(Prolific, 2022). Although I used filters to select White, mostly conservative, United
States residents, the sample distribution leaned more towards “slightly” conservative
rather than “extremely” conservative and I do not know the geographic distribution of
these participants. Future research should examine the current cultural change paradigm
within a more representative sample of the White United States residents of interest.
Furthermore, it would be informative for future research using this paradigm to target
samples recruited from forums or message boards which are open to or support more
extreme right rhetoric; this targeted sampling strategy may be able to capture the
processes by which people are entering into ideological radicalization and how this may
affect threat perceptions and its downstream consequences.
Another valuable avenue for future research would be to explore how people react
to organically occurring demographic changes within their neighborhoods. As
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exemplified in the opening quote from Tucker Carlson, people experiencing swift
demographic changes may feel more threatened than a person being told of an amorphous
demographic threat that they are not currently experiencing. Experimental or quasiexperimental research could test threat perceptions and its downstream consequences in
areas currently experiencing noticeable demographic changes compared to those living
within stable demographic conditions. For instance, Zou & Cheryan (2021) examined the
General Social Survey and found correlational evidence that those more threatened by
demographic changes also showed less willingness to live in racially diverse
neighborhoods. Researchers could extend this line of research by using timeseries
analysis with national surveys or localized surveys focusing on those geographic areas
experiencing demographic changes to determine a potential causal, instead of
correlational, relationship in areas experiencing an uptick in diversity. Furthermore, this
could also be evaluated using creative experiments that simulate real demographic
changes. For instance, Enos (2014) simulated demographic changes in a homogenously
White community by hiring Hispanic actors to start riding commuter trains with the local
population. These actors were instructed to speak in Spanish with one another on the train
platform and while commuting on the trains every day for two weeks. A pre- and posttest survey of the local commuters on those train platforms found that the commuters held
more exclusionary attitudes towards Hispanic immigrants after the two weeks of
simulated demographic changes compared to their pre-test levels. These experimental
and quas-experimental analyses may be able to capture authentic responses to naturalistic
cultural change.
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Cultural change occurs in a multitude of different ways, demographic changes are
just one way to signal real changes occurring in the nation and across the world. Beyond
the cultural change paradigm utilized in the current analysis and other analyses assessing
demographic changes, future studies should explore other potentially threatening cultural
changes to dominant groups like Whites in the United States. For instance, future studies
could explore the effects of changes occurring to traditional conceptions of family
structures, increased age in which people start families, or increased percentage of people
who never marry. These are all changes occurring in cultural norms over the past several
decades (Pew Research Center, 2015) which could potentially threaten those embracing
these once culturally stable traditions, like White nationalists.
Conclusion
With more support for White extremism and more instances of terrorism
committed on behalf of White extremist causes, such as the recent attack in Buffalo
(Bowman et al., 2022), it is exceedingly important for researchers to understand how a
changing nation can threaten White folk and lead to violent outcomes. Although the
current research was unable to support several of its hypotheses, it has opened avenues of
research that could provide valuable insight to this line of research. Threat in not uniform
and therefore should be examined for all of its complexities. I believe that understanding
threat perception in the wake of cultural change is the best way for us to fully understand
White hate and create pointed interventions to prevent its continuing rise.
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Appendix A: Demographic and Control Articles for Study 1
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Appendix B: Supplemental Factor Analyses for Study 1
Table B1
Eight-Factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis Including All Threat Items
Factor

Item

Status & Power Threat Status_1
Status_2
Status_3
Status_4_R

1.12
1.40
1.38
0.90

Standard
Error
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.11

Economic Threat

Economic_1
Economic_2
Economic_3
Economic_4_R

1.48
1.48
1.33
0.85

0.07
0.07
0.08
0.11

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Safety Threat

Safety_1
Safety_2
Safety_3
Safety_4_R

1.15
1.47
1.51
1.03

0.07
0.08
0.08
0.07

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Existential Threat

Existential_1
Existential_2
Existential_3_R

-0.63
-1.88
0.01

0.11
0.18
0.08

< .001
< .001
< .001

Education Threat

Education_1
Education_2
Education_3
Education_4_R

1.32
1.38
1.40
0.95

0.08
0.08
0.09
0.11

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Prototypicality Threat

Prototypicality_1
Prototypicality_2
Prototypicality_3
Prototypicality_4_R

1.51
1.35
1.44
0.98

0.08
0.08
0.09
0.07

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Culture & Value
Threat

Culture_1

1.31

0.09

< .001

1.35
1.45
1.05

0.08
0.08
0.08

< .001
< .001
< .001

1.51

0.08

< .001

1.39
1.45
0.75

0.08
0.08
0.09

< .001
< .001
< .001

Culture_2
Culture_3
Culture_4_R
Moral Standards
Threat

Moral_1
Moral_2
Moral_3
Moral_4_R

Estimate

p-value
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
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Table B2
Follow-Up Exploratory Factor Analysis Including All Threat Items
Item
Moral_3
Prototypicality_1
Safety_2
Safety_3
Culture_3
Moral_2
Moral_1
Prototypicality_2
Safety_1
Culture_1
Status_3
Status_2
Culture_2
Economic_2
Economic_1
Safety_4_R
Prototypicality_3
Existential_2
Status_1
Prototypicality_4
Economic_3
Culture_4_R
Education_2
Education_1
Moral_4_R

Factor 1
0.907
0.903
0.895
0.886
0.871
0.862
0.845
0.843
0.833
0.818
0.810
0.777
0.758
0.752
0.745
0.741
0.721
0.707
0.699
0.690
0.658
0.652
0.612
0.565
0.469

Education_4_R
Economic_4_R
Status_4_R
Education_3
Existential_3_R
Existential_1

-

Factor 2

Uniqueness
0.256
0.197
0.236
0.237
0.259
0.289
0.268
0.354
0.388
0.404
0.298
0.298
0.350
0.311
0.262
0.481
0.402
0.507
0.561
0.448
0.395
0.515
0.363
0.467
0.790

0.921
0.786
0.733
0.517

0.200
0.354
0.368
0.382

-

0.925
0.941

142
Table B3
One-Factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis on All White Nationalism Items
Factor

Variable

White Nationalism
Beliefs

WN_1
WN_2
WN_3
WN_4
WN_5

Estimate

Standard
Error

p-value

1.32

0.08

< .001

1.08
1.45
1.43
0.86

0.10
0.10
0.07
0.07

< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001

Table B4
Two-Factor Confirmatory Factor Analysis on All Policy Items
Factor

Item

Immigration Policies

ImmPolicy_1
ImmPolicy_2
ImmPolicy_3
ImmPolicy_4
ImmPolicy_5_R
ImmPolicy_6_R

Racial Policies

RacePolicy_1
RacePolicy_2
RacePolicy_3
RacePolicy_4_R
RacePolicy_5_R
RacePolicy_6_R

Estimate
0.93
1.40
1.47
-0.41
0.67
0.84
1.38
1.61
1.40
1.12
0.82
1.14

Standard
Error
0.08
0.10
0.11
0.08
0.08
0.80
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.10
0.07
0.09

Table B5
Follow-Up Exploratory Factor Analysis Including All Policy Items
Item
RacePolicy_2
RacePolicy_1
RacePolicy_3
ImmPolicy_3
RacePolicy_6_R
ImmPolicy_2
RacePolicy_5_R
ImmPolicy_6_R
RacePolicy_4_R
ImmPolicy_1
ImmPolicy_5_R
ImmPolicy_4

Factor 1
0.801
0.731
0.728
0.688
0.685
0.677
0.654
0.608
0.595
0.578
0.441
-

Uniqueness
0.358
0.466
0.470
0.527
0.531
0.541
0.572
0.630
0.646
0.666
0.806
0.891

p-value
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
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Table B6
Mediation Effects for Cultural Change Manipulation on White Nationalism through
Threat Perceptions
Type

Effect

B

SE

95% CI

p

Component
Direct

Cultural Change → Status Threat
Status Threat → White Nationalism
Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.35
.67
-.12

.15
.04
.10

.02
< .001
.24

Total

Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.12

.14

Component

.38
.56

.15
.04

Direct

Cultural Change → Economic Threat
Economic Threat → White
Nationalism
Cultural Change → White Nationalism

[.06, .65]
[.59, .74]
[-.31,
.08]
[-.16,
.39]
[.08, .68]
[.48, .65]

-.10

.11

.38

Total

Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.12

.14

Component

Cultural Change → Safety Threat

.14

.15

Direct

Safety Threat → White Nationalism
Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.65
.03

.04
.10

Total

Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.12

.14

Component

.42
.39

.16
.05

Direct

Cultural Change → Existential Threat
Existential Threat → White
Nationalism
Cultural Change → White Nationalism

[-.32,
.12]
[-.16,
.39]
[-.16,
.44]
[.57, .72]
[-.17,
.22]
[-.16,
.39]
[.11, .73]
[.29, .48]

-.04

.13

Total

Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.12

.14

Component

.32
.53

.15
.05

Direct

Cultural Change → Education Threat
Education Threat → White
Nationalism
Cultural Change → White Nationalism

-.05

.12

Total

Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.12

.14

[-.29,
.21]
[-.16,
.39]
[.03, .61]
[.44, .62]
[-.28,
.18]
[-.16,
.39]

.40
.01
< .001

.40
.34
< .001
.78
.40
.008
< .001
.73
.40
.03
< .001
.67
.40
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Direct

Cultural Change → Prototypicality
Threat
Prototypicality Threat → White
Nationalism
Cultural Change → White Nationalism

Total

Component

.35

.16

[.03, .66]

.03

.62

.04

[.55, .69]

< .001

-.10

.10

.33

Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.12

.14

Component

Cultural Change → Cultural Threat

.28

.16

Direct

Cultural Threat → White Nationalism
Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.60
-.05

.04
.10

Total

Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.12

.14

Component

Cultural Change → Moral Threat

.15

.16

Direct

Moral Threat → White Nationalism
Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.61
.03

.04
.10

Total

Cultural Change → White Nationalism

.12

.14

[-.29,
.10]
[-.16,
.39]
[-.03,
.59]
[.52, .68]
[-.26,
.15]
[-.16,
.39]
[-.17,
.47]
[.54, .68]
[-.17,
.23]
[-.16,
.39]

.40
.07
< .001
.62
.40
.37
< .001
.77
.40
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Table B7
Mediation Effects for Cultural Change Manipulation on Outgroup Restricting Policies
through Threat Perceptions
Type
Component
Direct
Total
Component

Direct
Total
Component

Direct
Total
Component

Direct
Total
Component

Direct
Total

Effect

B

SE

95% CI

p

Cultural Change → Status Threat
Status Threat → Restricting Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Economic Threat
Economic Threat → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Safety Threat

.35
.52
-.11

.15
.04
.10

.02
< .001
.27

.07

.13

.38
.53

.15
.04

[.03, .34]
[.45, .60]
[-.31,
.09]
[-.18,
.32]
[.08, .68]
[.45, .60]

-.13

.10

.19

.07

.13

.14

.15

Safety Threat → Restricting Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Existential Threat
Existential Threat → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Education Threat
Education Threat → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies

.50
.00

.04
.10

.07

.13

.42
.27

.16
.04

[-.33,
.07]
[-.18,
.32]
[-.16,
.44]
[.42, .58]
[-.20,
.21]
[-.18,
.32]
[.11, .73]
[.18, .36]

-.04

.12

.07

.13

.32
.54

.15
.04

-.10

.10

.07

.13

[-.28,
.20]
[-.18,
.32]
[.03, .61]
[.46, .61]
[-.30,
.10]
[-.18,
.32]

.57
.01
< .001

.57
.36
< .001
.98
.57
.008
< .001
.73
.57
.03
< .001
.32
.57
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Component

Direct
Total
Component

Direct
Total
Component

Direct
Total

Cultural Change → Prototypicality
Threat
Prototypicality Threat → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Cultural Threat

.35

.16

[.03, .66]

.03

.47

.04

[.39, .54]

< .001

-.09

.10

.39

.07

.13

.28

.16

Cultural Threat → Restricting Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Moral Threat

.50
-.07

.04
.10

.07

.13

.15

.16

Moral Threat → Restricting Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies
Cultural Change → Restricting
Policies

.48
.00

.04
.10

.07

.13

[-.29,
.12]
[-.18,
.32]
[-.03,
.59]
[.43, .58]
[-.27,
.13]
[-.18,
.32]
[-.17,
.47]
[.41, .55]
[-.20,
.20]
[-.18,
.32]

.57
.07
< .001
.48
.57
.37
< .001
.99
.57
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Appendix C: Original Education Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Study 2a
Table C1
Repeated Measures ANOVA for Original Education Threat Condition Predicting Threat
Assessment
Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

p

η2

RM Factor

29.4

4

7.35

8.26

< .001

.06

Residual

195.9

220

.89

Table C2
Post Hoc Tests for Repeated Measures ANOVA for Original Education Threat Condition
Comparison

Mean
Difference

SE

df

t

Pbonferroni

Status

- Education

.05

.18

220

.30

1.00

Economic

- Education

-.35

.18

220

-1.98

.50

Existential - Education

-.30

.18

220

-1.70

.90

Education

-.55

.18

220

-3.10

.02

- Prototypicality

Note. Table only displays post hoc relationships as they relate to the education threat
condition
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Appendix D: Threat Manipulation Article for Studies 2a and 2b
Status Threat Manipulation

149
Economic Threat Manipulation

150
Existential Threat Manipulation

151
Original Education Threat Manipulation

152
Final Education Threat Manipulation

153
Prototypicality Threat Manipulation

154
Assuaged Threat Manipulation
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Appendix E: Bayesian Analyses Conducted for Study 2b
Table E1
Bayesian ANCOVA of Threat Condition and Political Identity Predicting White
Nationalism Beliefs in Study 2b.

Table E2
Bayesian ANCOVA of Threat Condition and Political Identity Predicting Outgroup
Restricting Policy Support in Study 2b.
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Appendix F: Study 1 and 2b Materials
Recruitment
Study Name: Social and Political Change Survey
Study Description: This research study investigates people’s attitudes and opinions regarding
recent social and political issues in the United States. Your participation will involve completing
a survey regarding your attitudes and opinions about a recent news article, racial issues,
government policy, cultural change, and demographic information about yourself (e.g., gender,
race/ethnicity, age).

Informed consent process
Statement of Consent from the Subject:
I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns answered.
By completing the survey you are indicating your consent to be in the research.
Click ‘I agree to participate’ if you wish to continue to the survey.

o
o

I agree to participate
I do not wish to participate

Page capturing Prolific ID
Before you start, please remove or turn off any possible distractions so you can focus on
this study. Thank you!
Please enter your Prolific ID:
_____________

Demographics section
What is your age (i.e., 37)?
_____________

Which of the following do you identify with most?

o
o
o

Female
Male
Non Binary
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o

Not listed (specify): ________________________________________

Which of the following best describes you?

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Alaskan Native / American Indian / Indigenous
Black/African
East Asian
Hispanic / LatinX
Middle Eastern / North African
Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander
South Asian / Southeast Asian
White
Not listed (specify): ________________________________________

How important is your race to your identity?

o
o
o
o
o

Not at all important
Slightly important
Moderately important
Very important
Extremely important

What is your household's annual income?
The slider represents $1,000 increments (e.g., "23" = $23,000). Move the slider until the
number in the box best represents your annual income in 2020 in thousands of dollars.
If above $150,000, just select "150".
$0
0

$75,000

$150,000 +

15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150

()

What is the highest level of education you have achieved?
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Less than a high school degree
High school degree of GED
Some college
2 year degree / Associates degree / Trade school or license
4 year degree (BA or BS)
Masters degree or Professional degree
Doctorate (e.g., MD, PhD)

How would you characterize your political views overall?

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Very liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Centrist / moderate
Slightly conservative
Conservative
Very conservative

Article Manipulation
•
•

Study 1: Demographic shift vs control
Study 2b:
o Status Manipulation
o Economic Manipulation
o Existential Manipulation
o Education Manipulation
o Prototypicality Manipulation
o Assuaged Manipulation

Please answer the following questions about the article you just read.
Which of the following statements best describes the topic of the article you just read?

o
o

Racial demographic changes are occurring in the U.S.
Geographic mobility is increasing with people moving to suburbs
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o
o

The new presidential administration has made economic policy changes
Solar, wind, and other clean energy sources are increasing in popularity

How interesting was the article you read?

o
o
o
o
o

Not interesting at all
Slightly interesting
Moderately interesting
Very interesting
Extremely interesting

How much do you trust the author of the article?

o
o
o
o
o

Not at all
A little bit
A moderate amount
A lot
Completely

[only included in Study 1] Think about the article you read.
Do you think there will be consequences from the changes you read about?
If so, what do you think those consequences will be? How would the U.S. change as a
result?
If not, why won’t these changes matter?
________________________________________________________________
Start of Block: Threats
You will now be asked questions regarding your opinions and attitudes towards recent
political and social issues and commentaries in the United States.

Please give your honest opinion on these recent political and social issues and
commentaries. (-3, strongly disagree — 0, neither disagree nor agree — +3, strongly
agree)
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1. If racial/ethnic minorities increase in numbers, it will lower the status of Whites in
America.
2. Racial/ethnic minorities have too much influence in American society.
3. Racial/ethnic minorities are gaining too much political power in the United States.
4. Whites hold too many positions of power in the United States.
5. Racial/ethnic minorities are taking economic opportunities away from Whites in
America (e.g., jobs, loans).
6. Racial/ethnic minorities are taking jobs away from Whites.
7. Racial/ethnic minorities have fewer economic opportunities in America compared
to Whites.
8. Social services have become less available to Whites because of racial/ethnic
minorities.
Page Break
9. I am fearful for my safety when I am near racial/ethnic minorities.
10. The vast majority of racial/ethnic minorities are law abiding citizens.
11. Racial/ethnic minorities make communities less safe.
12. Racial/ethnic minorities threaten law and order in the United States.
13. Whites will remain the dominant group in America for a very long time.
14. It is likely that the White race won’t exist in the future.
15. The existence of the White race is in jeopardy.
Page Break
16. Racial/ethnic minorities make it harder for Whites to get into good schools.
17. Schools spend too many resources on their racial/ethnic minority students.
18. White students are given better educational opportunities compared to
racial/ethnic minority students.
19. The education system benefits racial/ethnic minorities more than Whites in
America.
20. Racial/ethnic minorities pose a threat to what it means to be American.
21. Racial/ethnic minorities do not represent the American identity.
22. Racial/ethnic minorities make positive contributions to the American identity.
23. Due to demographic changes, I fear that in the future it won’t be clear what it
means to be American.
24. Racial/ethnic minorities do not have the same work ethic as most Americans.
25. Racial/ethnic minorities don’t respect American culture.
26. Racial/ethnic minorities violate traditional American family values.
27. Cultural diversity makes the United States stronger.
Page Break
28. Racial/ethnic minorities contribute to the moral decline in American society.
29. Racial/ethnic minorities do not adhere to American moral standards.
30. Racial/ethnic minorities have lower moral standards than Whites in America.
31. Racial/ethnic minorities live by the same moral standards as Whites in America.
32. In America, please select 'Somewhat agree' if you are paying attention.
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Start of Block: White Nationalism
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Multiculturalism is the biggest threat to White America.
I am sympathetic to organizations/groups that bring attention to White concerns.
White American culture is what makes this country great.
One of the problems with America is the decline of Whiteness.
In order to maintain White status, it is sometimes necessary to use violence
towards racial/ethnic minority groups.

Start of Block: Policies
1. In order to deter illegal immigration, the government should separate immigrant
children from their parents.
2. The U.S. government should unconditionally ban immigrants from countries
deemed dangerous.
3. The amount of foreign immigration from Latin America to the United States
should be increased.
4. The amount of foreign immigration from Europe to the United States should be
increased.
5. Legal immigrants should have full access to jobs and resources (e.g., education,
healthcare) when they arrive in the United States.
6. Immigrants to the United States should be required to speak English.
7. Increasing police patrols in racial/ethnic minority communities is necessary to
lower crime.
8. The government should spend more money on schools in racial/ethnic minority
neighborhoods.
9. The government should use the military to control rallies/protests that promote
racial/ethnic minority causes (e.g., Black Lives Matter).
10. Employers should take extra steps to diversify their employees when making
hiring and promotion decisions.
Page Break
11. Schools should teach the history of racial/ethnic minority groups in America to
the same degree as White history.
12. The government does not owe special treatment to racial/ethnic minorities for
discrimination their racial group experienced in the past.
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Appendix G: Study 2a Survey
Recruitment
Study Name: Social and Political Change Survey
Study Description: This research study investigates people’s opinions regarding recent social
and political issues in the United States. Your participation will involve completing a survey
regarding your opinions about a recent news article and demographic information about yourself
(e.g., gender, race/ethnicity, age).

Informed consent process
Statement of Consent from the Subject:
I have read the above information. I have had all my questions and concerns answered.
By completing the survey you are indicating your consent to be in the research.
Click ‘I agree to participate’ if you wish to continue to the survey.

o
o

I agree to participate
I do not wish to participate

Page capturing Prolific ID
Before you start, please remove or turn off any possible distractions so you can focus on
this study. Thank you!
Please enter your Prolific ID:
_____________

Demographics section
What is your age (i.e., 37)?
_____________

Which of the following do you identify with most?

o
o
o

Female
Male
Non Binary
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o

Not listed (specify): ________________________________________

Which of the following best describes you?

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Alaskan Native / American Indian / Indigenous
Black/African
East Asian
Hispanic / LatinX
Middle Eastern / North African
Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander
South Asian / Southeast Asian
White
Not listed (specify): ________________________________________

How important is your race to your identity?

o
o
o
o
o

Not at all important
Slightly important
Moderately important
Very important
Extremely important

What is your household's annual income?
The slider represents $1,000 increments (e.g., "23" = $23,000). Move the slider until the
number in the box best represents your annual income in 2021 in thousands of dollars.
If above $150,000, just select "150".
$0
0

$75,000

$150,000 +

15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150

()

What is the highest level of education you have achieved?
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Less than a high school degree
High school degree of GED
Some college
2 year degree / Associates degree / Trade school or license
4 year degree (BA or BS)
Masters degree or Professional degree
Doctorate (e.g., MD, PhD)

How would you characterize your political views overall?

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Very liberal
Liberal
Slightly liberal
Centrist / moderate
Slightly conservative
Conservative
Very conservative

Manipulations (one of these six are presented):
•
•
•
•
•
•

Status Manipulation
Economic Manipulation
Existential Manipulation
Education Manipulation
Prototypicality Manipulation
Assuaged Manipulation

Please answer the following questions about the article you just read.
Which of the following statements best describes the topic of the article you just read?

o
o

Racial demographic changes are occurring in the U.S.
Geographic mobility is increasing with people moving to suburbs
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o
o

The new presidential administration has made economic policy changes
Solar, wind, and other clean energy sources are increasing in popularity

How interesting was the article you read?

o
o
o
o
o

Not interesting at all
Slightly interesting
Moderately interesting
Very interesting
Extremely interesting

To what extent did the article suggest that minorities threaten... (0, not at all — 4,
Extremely)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

...White Americans' status in the United States
...White Americans' economic prosperity
...White Americans' existence as a racial category
...White Americans' access to top quality education
...White Americans being seen as the typical American

